

Transparency International Anti-Corruption Helpdesk Answer

Corruption and the crisis of democracy

The link between corruption and the weakening of democratic institutions

Author(s): Eliska Drapalova, tihelpdesk@transparency.org

Reviewer(s): Alina Mungiu-Pippidi, Bonnie Jo Palifka, Jon Vrushi

Date: 06 March 2019

The relationship between corruption and democracy is a complex one. However, both concepts are closely intertwined. When democracy deteriorates, we can almost certainly expect an increase in corruption due to the erosion of institutional checks and balances, independence of courts and frequent restriction of the space for civil society actions and political rights of citizens. Likewise, when corruption is not tackled, new democratic states can hardly consolidate.

This is especially true of political corruption that plunders the country's natural resources and widespread petty corruption that impede the ability for citizens to fully enjoy their new political and social rights. Unresolved or increasing corruption can also undermine citizens' trust in already established democracies and provoke all sorts of citizens' reactions like abstention and distrust, or contribute to other destabilising phenomena like voting for anti-establishment parties and the spread of fake news.

Given the large impact corruption has on democracy, sustained efforts to limit corruption can improve the strength of democracy by promoting just and competitive elections, ensuring better quality and delivery of public services and improving citizens' trust in political institutions and governments. The effort of international and local organizations and NGOs to limit corruption should be seen as a contribution to the consolidation of democratic regimes and efforts to improve the quality of governance.

© 2019 Transparency International. All rights reserved.

This document should not be considered as representative of the Commission or Transparency International's official position. Neither the European Commission, Transparency International nor any person acting on behalf of the Commission is responsible for the use which might be made of the following information.

This Anti-Corruption Helpdesk is operated by Transparency International and funded by the European Union.



Query

What is the relationship between corruption and the crisis of democracy?

Contents

1. What do we exactly mean by democracy?
2. Can democracy contribute to tackling corruption?
3. The limits of democracy on the control of corruption
4. Can we talk about the crisis of democracy?
5. How does corruption contribute to the crisis of democracy?
6. Does control of corruption strengthen democracy?
7. Conclusions
8. References

What do we exactly mean by democracy?

The relationship between democracy and corruption is a complex one. Although democracies are said to be the least corrupt form of government, there is a relatively large number of democracies that have a surprisingly low corruption perception index (CPI) score, while some openly non-democratic countries and autocracies are relatively successful in reducing corruption.

Before disentangling the relationship between democracy and corruption, we have to be clear about what we refer to when we talk about democracy and democratic government.

Democracy, like corruption, has no clear and unitary definition. On the contrary, there is a large body of research with a diverse understanding of which aspects are crucial for a democratic government. Only a few concepts have such long

Main points

- Democracy is multi-dimensional concept.
- Consolidated democracies are more successful in curbing corruption.
- Corruption seriously undermines democratic governance.
- Sustained efforts to limit corruption and political discretion and the support for societal accountability can also have a positive impact on the strength of democracy and its institutions.

lists of possible associated adjectives like democracy. We can talk about a liberal, direct, representative or even post-democracy (for an exhaustive list of adjectives see Collier and Levitsky 1997). This section, briefly distinguishes these different concepts and finds a definition of democracy as a guide in the following analysis.

The electoral conception of democracy

According to Schmitter and Karl “modern political democracy is a system of governance in which rulers are held accountable for their actions in the public realm by citizens, acting indirectly through the competition and cooperation of their elected representatives” (Schmitter and Karl 1991, 76). This and similar conceptions are known as the “electoral democracy definition”. In this a

minimalist conception where the backbone of democracy is vertical electoral accountability. In other words, the election of the ruling elite is based "on the formal, universal right to vote and free, competitive and regular elections (Merkel 2004, 34)."

However, many authors criticise that idea of equating democracy to a struggle for an election among competing candidates as being too minimal. According to authors like Pippa Norris, the fairness and correct execution of elections are difficult to judge and determine (Norris 2012). A comprehensive definition of democracy has to go beyond simple electoral contests to include other aspects such as the existence of the rule of law, institutional checks and balances, and respect for the rights of minorities (Merkel 2004, 37). Also, this definition is not very useful for our analysis of the link between corruption and democracy as it focuses only on the electoral arena.

More than just free elections: A multidimensional definition of democracy

A large number of researchers go beyond the electoral aspects of democracy and try to capture the complex institutional variation that exists between democratic systems (Morlino 2004). They add other dimensions to the definition: the deliberative and participatory aspects as well as the rule of law, responsiveness, freedom and equality, respect for independent institutions, and checks and balances (Ercan and Gagnon 2014; Morlino 2004; Munck 2016). The democratic participation aspect guarantees citizens' involvement in the democratic process and that policy outcomes reflect citizens' will. The rule of law denotes supremacy of laws that limit politicians' powers and will. Institutional checks and balances refer to the interplay between institutional responsiveness and societal accountability. In this case, independent tribunals and administration act as effective controls of politicians and ensure the correct and impartial implementation of public policies and redistribution of public resources (Rothstein 2017, 2014).

These points were summarised and systematised by Wolfgang Merkel's concept of "embedded

democracy". At the core of this concept are five interdependent components: i) democratic election, ii) political participation rights; iii) civil rights; iv) horizontal accountability; v) and effective power to govern (Merkel 2014, 14).

The competitive electoral process is at the heart of modern democracies, but other factors complement it. The democratic election component refers to the electoral game, and it is equivalent to the "electoralist" democracy definition. Freedom of speech, association and protest form the "political participation rights component". Civil rights provide protection from illegitimate state interference into the life of an individual and are therefore linked to the protection of minorities, individual liberty and property. Horizontal accountability ensures the mutual interdependence and autonomy of the legislative, executive and judicial power as well as the functioning of oversight institutions such as audit institutions and ombudsmen (checks and balances). Finally, the effective power to govern ensures that only "those elected are entitled to make binding political decisions without the interference of other actors or interest groups like the military" (Merkel 2014, 16).

For Merkel, a fully-fledged democracy is a system where these five components are balanced and closely related, what he calls mutually embedded. He also acknowledges the role of external conditions that shape (stabilise or undermine) democratic governance, such as civil society strength, socio-economic context (economic crisis or growth) and international collaboration within different international organisations.

According to Merkel, this definition of embedded democracy is at the right level to empirically assess the performance of democracies. It is more comprehensive than the limited electoral definition, and it also avoids mixing components of democratic regimes with normative outcomes, like social justice or redistribution, that are part of maximalist models of democracy. Following this reasoning, this query uses Merkel's embedded democracy components as the starting point to structure the debate around the relationship between democracy and corruption.

Can democracy contribute to tackling corruption?

From a look at the CPI scores and the existing research, it seems that democracy is the least corrupt form of government (Drury, Kriekhaus and Lusztig 2006; Moss, Pettersson and van de Walle 2006; Kotera, Okada and Samreth 2012). The reason that many scholars find democratic countries more successful at curbing corruption, defined by Transparency International as an abuse of entrusted power for private gain¹ is the conjunct action of factors mentioned above (the rule of law, checks and balances, societal and electoral accountability, civil rights and effective power to govern) that limit discretionary power and increase the responsibility of political representatives.

The principal democratic mechanism that can contribute to curbing corruption is the democratic electoral process. The electoral competition and the desire for re-election constrain, at least in theory, the greed of politicians (Rose-Ackerman 1999 and Palifka 2016; Drury, Kriekhaus and Lusztig 2006). Frequent and competitive elections work as a mechanism for the selection of better candidates (Kunicová and Rose-Ackerman 2005; Golden and Chang 2001; Bågenholm 2013; Montinola and Jackman 2002). New parties need to build a good reputation, so they are generally less corrupt (Broms, Dahlström and Fazekas 2017; Klačnja 2015). Moreover, electoral competition works as a sanctioning mechanism, where corrupt politicians and parties can be voted out of the office (Bågenholm 2013; Chong et al. 2011; Broms 2018).

However, it is important to note that many studies also find that this beneficial effect of competitive elections is mediated by the type of corruption (Fernández-Vázquez, Barberá and Rivero 2016; Riera et al. 2013; Montero et al. 2011), presence of alternative candidates (Esarey and Schwindt-Bayer 2018; Charron and Bågenholm 2016), size of circumscription (Carreras 2017) or electoral system (Tavits 2007; Golden and Chang 2001).

Political rights constitute freedom of speech, and the right to demonstrate and associate. Democracies allow for the plurality of opinions and their expression in a free press, and the possibility to organise and voice disagreement with the governments. These factors are essential conditions for societal accountability, transparency and collective action that restrict the possibility of political abuse of power for private gain (Lindstedt and Naurin 2010; Charron 2009). The research shows that a free press and media contribute significantly to greater accountability and lower corruption (Chowdhury 2004; Brunetti and Weder 2003).

Civil rights grant liberty and property, and protect citizens from illegitimate state interference. According to Rose Ackerman (1999), the protection of civil liberties and free speech that are part of democratic constitutions make transparent and non-corrupt government possible. Active and independent civil society can exercise control and limit the arbitrariness of government. Social capital theories maintain that more participative and civic-minded citizens will act as watchdogs, alerting against corruption and adding an extra layer of accountability (Putnam, Feldstein and Cohen 2004; Putnam, Leonardi and Nanetti 1994; Putnam 2000). This proposition is supported by empirical studies that found that societies in which social networks are abundant and social trust is high have less corruption (Rothstein and Uslaner 2005; Rothstein and Stolle 2009). Protection of minorities and female empowerment are also crucial aspects that limit corruption. Stensöta and Wängnerud's research finds that democracies with higher levels of gender equality in the political system lead to lower levels of corruption (Stensöta and Wängnerud 2018).

The Gambia recently improved in terms of control of corruption, mainly in the areas of electoral rights and electoral competition (Rahman 2019). It was mainly the change of government that allowed for a renewal of anti-corruption commitments and a strengthening of political rights and freedoms. The new government enacted freedom of press and established the Commission that would investigate crimes committed by the previous government, including corruption. The Gambia jumped 7 points

¹ <https://www.transparency.org/glossary/term/corruption>

in the CPI from last year and saw one of the largest improvements on the Freedom in the World indicators, registering a 21-point increase (with a substantial increase from not free to partly free).

Moreover, democracy is a system built on effective horizontal accountability. In other words, it is based on the idea that the legislative, executive and judicial powers should be balanced and should mutually check each other (Collier and Levitsky 1997). Notably, the rule of law and independence of the judiciary are essential for the effective control of corruption (Voigt and Gutmann 2015; Elbasani and Šabić 2017). When politicians or civil servants abuse power for their personal enrichment, the tribunals should ensure correct and timely punishment and provide impartial application of the law to everyone.


Stefan Voigt and Jerg Gutman researched the effects of judicial organisation and independence on the level of corruption. They show that judicial independence, as well as that of prosecution agencies, is correlated with lower levels of corruption (Voigt and Gutmann 2015). Besides, the effectiveness of the rule of law and the judiciary is directly related to the peoples' reasoning about the costs and benefits of corruption (Lambsdorff 2002, 2012). According to rational choice theory, people weigh the gains from corrupt dealing against the probability of detection and the expected size of punishment. If the probability of being punished or the size of the penalty are low, the legal actions are not performing as a deterrent for people to engage in corruption (Becker 1968; Rose-Ackerman 1975). For instance, low fines for embezzling and non-existing asset recovery legislation keep corruption profitable even when discovered (Rose-Ackerman and Palifka 2018)

The limits of democracy on the control of corruption

As described in the previous section, if the different aspects of democracy are balanced, they allow for the inclusion of interests, representation and participation of citizens, and limit opportunities for corruption. Can we thus conclude that installing a democratic form of government will root out corruption? This would be too rosy a view. We know from the research that some corruption can

be explained by the country's socio-economic development (Pinto and Zhu 2016). Many other factors, such as historical legacies or education matter too (Rothstein 2015; Rothstein and Teorell 2015; Acemoglu and Robinson 2012; Acemoglu, Johnson and Robinson 2002; Uslaner and Rothstein 2016). There is a temptation to load too many expectations on democracy and to imagine that, by attaining democracy, society will resolve all of its political, social and economic problems plus eradicate corruption and abuse of power. Recent scandals in Brazil, Mexico, Spain, Italy and elsewhere show that democracies still suffer from corruption. The empirical research concludes that democratisation alone does not easily translate into lower levels of corruption (Rothstein 2011, Mungiu-Pippidi and Johnston 2017).

In fact, corruption often worsens in newly democratised countries. Although one would assume that the level of corruption falls as democracy matures (Kolstad and Wiig 2016), studies that cover a large number of countries and years show that the relation between the maturity of democracy and level of corruption is not linear (Sung 2004; Rock 2009; Bäck and Hadenius 2008; Montinola and Jackman 2002). In other words, in young democracies, the level of corruption increases (as there are more opportunities for corruption but the laws and institutions still have to be enforced) to consequently fall as the democratic regime consolidates and the executive, legislative and judicial powers balance up, creating a sort of inverted U-shape when plotted over time.



Recent research shows that transition to good governance is a long term process where electoral accountability is only a first step that has to be followed by effective checks on political power (independent tribunals and media) and active civil society. More than making electoral democracy work, it is a state building process (Mungiu-Pippidi and Johnston 2017).

Democracy is a multidimensional concept, and not all dimensions are equally consolidated in a given country. Merkel points to the possibility of a crisis/deficiency of different democratic components (Merkel 2014). Thus it is possible that some countries perform well in one dimension (electoral competition) but have reserves in others (independence of the judiciary or limited social rights and liberties). Therefore, it is possible that corruption "infests" these weak points. When corruption extends, it undermines one or more of the democratic pillars and can significantly impair the overall democratic strength. Ultimately, a perverse and vicious circle that reinforces corruption is installed and further undermines democratic processes (Rothstein 2017).

Can we talk about the crisis of democracy?

The number of democracies increased until 2011, then stabilised around 97. Since then, there is considerable instability within the established categories. In other words, there are not many countries that regress from democracy to autocracy, but there is a larger number of democracies in which electoral competition or liberal values deteriorate (Mechkova, Lührmann and Lindberg 2017). According to the Democracy in Crisis report by Freedom House "71 countries suffered net declines in political rights and civil liberties, with only 35 registering gains" (Freedom House 2018). Once-promising states, such as Turkey, Poland and Tunisia, are now declining in democratic standards (Freedom House 2018).

In line with this finding, Merkel (2004) finds a much more pronounced decline in citizens' satisfaction with democracy and trust in institutions. In Europe, this decline is most prominent in countries with high levels of corruption and economic stagnation. Some young democracies are backsliding in the

civil liberties and freedom of expression components, while transition to democracy halted in few countries, as in Thailand (Mechkova, Lührmann and Lindberg 2017).

Those considered to be consolidated democracies are also showing signs of democratic backsliding manifested in long-term fading of traditional political participation, steep declines in trust and satisfaction with government and democratic institutions, like parties and parliaments. In some countries, there is a dismantling of the democratic institutions, such as independent tribunals, universities and audit institutions (Orban's attack against Central European University, and Erdogan's purging of universities and courts after an attempted coup).

Perhaps the most debated example is in the United States decline of political rights, civil liberties and decreasing oversight of political institutions (Freedom House 2018). The US CPI score dropped by 4 points, from 75 (2017) to 71 (2018). Freedom House downgraded its democracy score from 92 (2015) to 86 points (2018). A similar trend is evident in Bertelsmann's Sustainable Governance Indicators (SGI) where the US registers a drop in the quality of democracy score from 2016 onwards (from 8.07 to 7.4). The areas that deteriorated most were access to information (from 8.7 to 7.3 points) and the rule of law (from 8 to 7.3 points).

President Trump repeatedly criticized and tried to weaken the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act (FCPA) and made cabinet appointments with potential conflicts of interest. According to Freedom House, the US democratic institutions have suffered erosion due to violations of fundamental ethical standards (false statements by the administration), reduction in government transparency, including the president's refusal to disclose personal tax data, and erosion of institutional checks and balances like firing the head of the Federal Bureau of Investigations (FBI) or pressuring the judges (Freedom House 2018).

The unresolved problems of current democracies and economic crises have increased the attractiveness of populist, anti-establishment or even anti-democratic political forces that further endanger the strength of liberal democracies (Mounk and Kyle 2018). Brazil's corruption

scandals involving the Workers' Party and worsening of the country's economic situation led to the impeachment of President Dilma Rousseff (the Workers' Party member) and possibly contributed to the recent electoral victory of Jair Bolsonaro. Although soon after the elections, we cannot yet see the impact of the vote on the country's democratic performance and the level of corruption, there is however a fear that Brazilian democracy will continue its descent in international rankings as the newly elected president has shown, on repeated occasions, anti-democratic and authoritarian tendencies (Mounk and Kyle 2018).

How is the crisis of democracy linked to corruption?

In general, a weakening of democracy and the deteriorating performance of government may lead to widespread scepticism and dissatisfaction that can lead to a higher perception of corruption. Moreover, when one or several aspects of a democratic regime weakens or enters a crisis, corruption can spread within and infest the remaining components. For example, when institutional checks decrease while the discretion of politicians and the influence of powerful individuals is high, corruption extends. Thus we can say that a crisis of democracy or of its components and corruption reinforce each other.

For example, Hungary's Prime Minister Victor Orbán is continuously dismantling institutional checks and balances that would limit his executive powers. In 2012, he managed to change the constitution and recently he created a new court that would supervise the public administration and deal with corruption. Hungary's CPI score has dropped from 55 to 46 between 2012 and 2018 and it registered the worse score in political rights by Freedom House since its democratic transition.

How does corruption contribute to the crisis of democracy?

It is well established that corruption undermines economic growth, decreases state capacity,

redistribution of wealth and the allocation of talent (Goldsmith 1999; Dimant and Tosato 2018; Pinto and Zhu 2016). Corruption is associated with brain drain (Mungiu-Pippidi 2015a), environmental degradation (Povitkina 2018) and child mortality (Holmberg and Rothstein 2011). However, it also hurts democracies by undermining the fragile balance between institutions, and rules and norms that provide trust and legitimacy of the system. Using the five elements of embedded democracy (Merkel 2004), this sections looks at how corruption undermines democracy.

Free and fair elections

According to Merkel, if corruption infects a democratic electoral system, it strikes at the heart of democracy (Merkel 2014, 14). Corruption in the form of electoral fraud and vote buying is the most frequent form how incumbents try to remain in power (Nyblade and Reed 2008; Ziblatt 2009). More resourceful candidates may engage in vote buying, while those less consolidated frequently threaten the opposition (Mares and Young 2016; Mares and Zhu 2015; Stokes et al. 2013; Khemani 2015). The state budget is a formidable resource to feed clientelistic networks, so elections are frequently targeted by corrupt politicians. Likewise, influence peddling and corruption are used to raise funds for election campaigns.

Political rights and participation

Corruption can provoke changes in voting behaviour, such as increasing voter abstention, increasing volatility or persistent discrimination against minorities, social classes and women. Eventually, corruption erodes the social contract between citizens and governments (Lauth 2000, 36; Goldberg 2018, 197; Della Porta and Vanucci 1997, 537; Warren 2004b; Zyglidopoulos 2016; Sundström 2015).

This breach of the social contract can lead to apathy and alienation of citizens from the political space. Agerberg (2018) shows that when corruption is high, educated citizens are likely to feel resignation rather than indignation and consequently withdraw from political participation. In the electoral game, this apathy is translated into lower voter turnout (Stockhammer 2017;

Stockemer, LaMontagne and Scruggs 2013; Carreras and Vera 2018).

Monika Bauhr and Nicholas Charron present a more nuanced argument showing that the effect of corruption on political participation depends on whether individuals benefit or not from corruption. Those excluded tend to abstain, whereas those that benefit from corruption maintain loyalty to the corrupt regime (Bauhr and Charron 2017). This perverse dynamics further limits the possibility of electoral change that would curb corruption. Corruption also affects the strength and ability of civil society to participate in the decision-making process (Guiso, Sapienza and Zingales 2010; Grimes 2013; Johnston 2005).

Monika Bauhr and Marcia Grimes (2014) show that, in the Latin American countries, exposure to endemic corruption demobilises the people. They found that, in a highly corrupt environment, transparency tends to breed resignation rather than protest (Bauhr and Grimes 2014). Moreover, corrupt regimes frequently repress associations and organisations that engage with accountability and anti-corruption. According to Transparency International findings, civil society organisations working on governance issues are subject to ever-greater restrictions on their operations while attacks on journalists are on the rise in many parts of the world. This further undermines the capacity of watchdog organisations and civil society to contrast corruption. In 2018 in Mexico, the media reported that several civil society activists, journalists and watchdog organisations working on corruption were victims of surveillance of their digital communication, presumably by government agencies (Freedom House 2018).

Importantly, countries with high corruption also limit female empowerment, representation and equality of opportunities. Research found that countries with high corruption have fewer female representatives in national and regional parliaments, and higher female electoral abstention (Alexander and Bågenholm 2018). Sundström and Wängnerud (2016) see corruption as an indication of informal power networks that benefit the already privileged and pose a direct obstacle to women and ethnic and religious minorities that are not part of these power networks.

Civil rights

As mentioned before, civil rights grant protection of liberty and property from illegitimate state interference. Corrupt governments, particularly in contexts with a culture of impunity, show disregard and at times contempt for human rights, and routinely overstep the reach of the state vis-a-vis their citizens. A joint study conducted by the International Council on Human Rights Policy and Transparency International in 2009 found that corruption may lead to violations of civil rights such as equality and non-discrimination as well as the right to a fair trial (International Council on Human Rights Policy, 2009). In Turkey recent political changes resulted in decline in political and civil rights and undermining the judicial independence. Turkey's CPI score is declining since 2013 and this year, Turkey's Freedom House rating fell from "partly free" to "not free" (Freedom House, 2018). Furthermore, the selective dispensation of justice and the illegitimate use of punitive measures by corrupt courts and law enforcement agencies are other clear examples of the adverse effects of corruption on civil rights (Ngugi 2004). Finally, corruption is associated with excessive and discretionary use of force by law enforcement agencies (Andersen, 2018; Forné, 2016).

Horizontal accountability mechanisms

Corruption undermines the balance between institutions, weakening the oversight of government, limiting the independence of courts and oversight agencies, and facilitating the arbitrary implementation of laws. The current president of Guatemala, Jimmy Morales attempted to suspend the operation of International Commission against Impunity (CICIG) due to investigation of corruption linked to his party and family members. Guatemala is still being classified as only "partly free" by the Freedom House and in CPI scores 27 out of 100.

Moreover, when people in a corrupt system feel that they are not treated equally by the law, they might resort to bribery, corruption and clientelism to exert political influence or obtain equal treatment (Marquette and Peiffer 2015; Rose and Peiffer 2015; Porta and Vannucci 2012). As a result, individuals are almost forced to engage in

corruption and to take on the corresponding role expectations.

In addition, if the effectiveness of the rule of law and judicial enforcement is low (as well as low expected punishment), the individual's evaluation of the costs and benefits of corruption are directly affected (Lambsdorff 2002, 2012; Rose-Ackerman and Palifka 2016). In other words, corruption becomes a less costly activity. Finally, corruption does not cause only unfair and arbitrary implementation of laws but as Zyglidopoulos (2016) points out, corruption can also facilitate legislation tailored explicitly to the interests of corrupt politicians or their clients to extract rents and personal benefits.

Ability to govern

Corruption undermines essential functions of the state, such as the monopoly of violence and security, delivery of basic services and effective control of borders (for example, corruption in customs). According to Chayes, one of the threats to democracy that is induced by corruption is the reduced ability of the state to delivery security to all citizens. She links corruption with the higher support for terrorist and religious fundamentalist groups (Chayes 2016). Likewise, researchers – mainly in Italy – show the link between organised criminality (mafia) and corruption (Vannucci and Sberna 2013; Buscaglia and Dijk 2003). Corruption also affects government effectiveness (Cingolani, Thomsson and Crombrugghe de 2015) and public services delivery (Porta, Sberna and Vannucci 2015). Montes and Paschoal (2016) found that less corrupt countries have a better quality of public services as well as better quality in the formulation and implementation of policies, and greater credibility and governmental commitment.

Undermining citizen trust

One cross-cutting and long-term consequence of corruption is the loss of citizens' trust in the political system and in society. The loss of citizens' trust in democratic institutions and actors leads to a further crisis of many of the five dimensions of democracy. When citizens feel that they are losing out by following formal rules while others are enjoying better outcomes through bribery and

other forms of illicit transactions and interactions, the support for democracy is undermined (Warren 2004a; Voigt and Gutmann 2015). Loss of trust in democratic institutions and actors leads to a drop in electoral support for traditional parties (Vampa 2015) and the subsequent rise of populist and anti-system parties (Hanley and Sikk 2016a; Bågenholm 2013). This may lead to further weakening of democratic norms and institutions, thus further entrenching the vicious circle of democratic decline.

Does control of corruption strengthen democracy?

In light of these adverse effects of corruption, would control of corruption significantly improve the strength of our democracies and performance of representative institutions? The research shows that the performance of government and the level of corruption are crucial for citizens' support and satisfaction with the democratic regime (Gilley 2006, Gjefsen 2012). Non-corrupt and effective bureaucracies matter more than electoral outcomes or the ideological congruence of government (Dahlberg and Holmberg 2014a, 2014b). The control of corruption is thus an important basis for democratic legitimacy (Magalhães 2016). Hence, there is a reasonable expectation that reducing corruption in public administration, judiciary and political parties will increase citizens' satisfaction with and support of democracy. A harder question is, however, where to start?

Following the electoralist definition of democracy, many scholars have focused on electoral laws that increase competition as sufficient to effectively reduce corruption (Kunicová and Rose-Ackerman 2005; Nyblade and Reed 2008). While this approach might be effective in countries where other democratic pillars work, this approach is not sufficient in countries with endemic corruption (Mungiu-Pippidi and Johnston 2017). One has to take into account that, in countries with widespread corruption, several democratic pillars (partial democratic regimes in Merkel's terminology) are undermined.

Likewise, the sole implementation of new and more sophisticated anti-corruption laws (whistle-

blower protection, for example) and new anti-corruption agencies will have limited impact. Only in countries where the rule of law is already functioning can anti-corruption agencies and laws make a difference (Persson, Rothstein and Teorell 2013; Voigt and Gutmann 2015). Indeed, the data show that countries with the most anti-corruption laws do not perform better in the control of corruption. This is generally because of their failure to implement and enforce these new rules (Mungiu-Pippidi 2013). For this reason, in contexts where corruption is widespread, we need to employ a more comprehensive approach to anti-corruption (Rose and Peiffer 2019). In other words, when designing an effective anti-corruption strategy, we need to take into account all aspects that constitute 'embedded' or 'deep democracy', the role of civil society (Johnston 2013). Research on improving control of corruption by Mungiu-Pippidi and her team proposes a political economy framework focusing on political reform that reduces discretionary power and access to rents, combined with societal and horizontal (institutional) accountability (Mungiu-Pippidi 2013).² Control of corruption then reaches an equilibrium when opportunities for corruption are checked by constraints imposed by the democratic institutions and the society.

In this model, resources for corruption include material resources and discretionary power, privileged access of a reduced number of actors, intentionally poor regulation or its excess, and a lack of transparency. Thus, the first step is to limit the discretionary power of politicians and civil servants. The solution is, however, not to reduce the size of the state or administration (some of the least corrupt countries like Sweden have a large public sector) (Montinola and Jackman 2002). It is rather about having clear rules (low administrative burden) and administrative capacity (Dahlberg and Holmberg 2014a, 2014b), which significantly reduces the discretion of politicians. Dahlström and Lapuente show that impartial and effective public administration is important for the containment of political power (Dahlström and Lapuente 2017).

² Control of corruption approach (CoC) refers to "society's capacity to constrain corrupt behaviour to enforce the norm of individual integrity in administration and politics to

Therefore, the effective control of corruption is not achieved by passing more and increasingly restrictive anti-corruption laws. Indeed, Italy and Romania have some of the most complex and strict anti-corruption legislation and yet they both lag behind in their effectiveness to control corruption. Corrupt countries generally do not suffer from a lack of anti-corruption legislation but have an implementation gap (enforcement of existing laws and divergence between the law and the norms). For this reason, Transparency International has been calling for the move from commitment to action to enforce the existing rules.

Technology recently opened up new possibilities for action. New digital tools can streamline procedures and enable greater transparency in previously highly complex and discretionary policy areas, such as public procurement. Recent experience with digital procurement, open tenders and more societal monitoring lead to more efficient procurement (Fazekas, Tóth and King 2016) and better service delivery (Herrera 2017). (For details on public procurement and the use of ProZorro in Ukraine [see here](#)).

For the institutional setting, laws and transparency procedures to be effective, we have to include effective mechanisms for accountability and checks on political power. Mungiu-Pippidi (2017) distinguishes between two types of checks or restrictions. The first are the dissuasive legal measures administered by the state. These are effective autonomous judicial power and audit institutions that are capable of enforcing legislation that deals with conflicts of interest. Investment in judicial capacity and protection of judicial autonomy from political or economic interference are crucial for correct enforcement of anti-corruption laws as well as for an end to impunity (Mungiu-Pippidi and Johnston 2017).

Second, normative dissuasive measures include both the existence of social norms that promote government impartiality, as well as societal monitoring through the active role of the media and civil society. Evidence shows the vital importance of an independent media and access to free

prevent state capture by particular interests, and thus promote the social welfare" (Mungiu-Pippidi 2015b).

information in anti-corruption efforts (Charron 2009; Brunetti and Weder 2003). The research shows that when the citizens have information about the corruption of their political representatives they are more likely to engage in control and accountability. This effect was found in Brazil (Winters and Weitz-Shapiro 2013), Uganda (Reinikka and Svensson 2005) and Mexico (Faughnan, Hiskey and Revey 2014). Persson and Rothstein found that, when citizens are aware of where their tax money goes, they engage more in accountability (Persson and Rothstein 2014).

Freedom of the press and an environment that ensures secure working conditions for journalists is fundamental. In 2018, Transparency International ([see here](#)) and [Committee to Protect Journalists](#) analysed the relationship between corruption and threats to the freedom of the press and civil society. They found that “out of the 368 journalists (many of them investigating corruption) dead since 2012, 96 per cent of those deaths happened in countries with CPI scores below 45”. In Mexico, which dropped by six points on the CPI since 2014, six journalists were killed in 2017 alone. Similar cases were reported in [Malta](#) and [Slovakia](#). Transparency International concludes that corruption increases the impunity that chips away the space for autonomous civil society and targets groups like journalists that challenge the status quo. At the same, the inability of citizens to criticise their government contributes to even greater impunity, abuse and corruption.

Johnston sees the strong and lasting social movement against corruption as a crucial step towards the change (Johnston 2005). If the institutions are non-responsive, strong civil society and protests are the remaining channels to influence policies and agendas in countries with high corruption rates. Mungiu-Pippidi and Johnston suggest that civil society campaigns need to build broader coalitions with other stakeholders if they want to have a real impact (Mungiu-Pippidi and Johnston 2017). Transparency International is committed to the support of civil society organisations that work to counter corruption and provide information, recommendations and tools to analyse and curb corruption.

In this collective endeavour to limit corruption, new technologies can be helpful in enabling collective

action, access and the circulation of information. Kossow and Kukutschka found a strong link between internet use and the control of corruption (Kossow and Kukutschka 2017). Peixoto and Fox found that new technologies that help citizens to organise collectively have a higher impact on political decision making and agenda setting (Peixoto 2012; Peixoto and Fox 2016; Spada et al. 2016).

Finally, the international commitment to counter corruption should be maintained. As Merkel argued, the international environment can potentially strengthen the democratic framework (Merkel 2014). The long-lasting activity of several international organisations has created space for more autonomous civil society action, a more comprehensive set of rules and more effective international enforcement of corruption crimes. For instance, the CPI helped to raise global awareness of the consequences of corruption and to make it one of the most important developmental issues.

Conclusions

The relationship between corruption and democracy is a complex one. However, it is clear from the literature review that the two are closely intertwined. When democracy deteriorates, there is almost always an increase in corruption due to the erosion of institutional checks and balances, fewer independent courts and frequent restrictions on the space for civil society actions and citizens' political rights.

Likewise, when corruption is widespread, newly democratic states can hardly consolidate. Unresolved corruption also undermines the trust of citizens in established democracies and provokes all sorts of citizens' reactions, like abstention and votes for populists and anti-establishment parties that further deteriorate the democratic system.

Given the large negative impact of corruption on democracy, sustained efforts to limit corruption can strengthen democracy. The example of the Gambia shows that international pressure and anti-corruption efforts by the new governments translate into more transparent and competitive elections and a consolidation of fundamental political and human rights.

References

- Acemoglu, Daron, Simon Johnson, and James A. Robinson. 2002. "Reversal of Fortune: Geography and Institutions in the Making of the Modern World Income Distribution." *The Quarterly Journal of Economics* 117 (4): 1231–94.
<https://doi.org/10.1162/003355302320935025>.
- Acemoglu, Daron, and James A Robinson. 2012. *Why Nations Fail: The Origins of Power, Prosperity, and Poverty*. New York: Crown Publishers.
- Agerberg, Mattias. 2017. "Failed Expectations: Quality of Government and Support for Populist Parties in Europe." *European Journal of Political Research* 56 (3): 578–600.
<https://doi.org/10.1111/1475-6765.12203>.
- Agerberg, Mattias. 2018. "The Curse of Knowledge? Education, Corruption, and Politics." *Political Behavior*, March, 1–31.
<https://doi.org/10.1007/s11109-018-9455-7>.
- Alexander, Amy C., and Andreas Bågenholm. 2018. "Does Gender Matter? Female Politicians' Engagement in Anti-Corruption Efforts." In *Gender and Corruption*, 171–89. Political Corruption and Governance. Palgrave Macmillan, Cham.
https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-70929-1_9.
- Alt, James E, and David Dreyer Lassen. 2008. "Political and Judicial Checks on Corruption: Evidence from American State Governments." *Economics & Politics* 20 (1): 33–61.
- Bäck, Hanna, and Axel Hadenius. 2008. "Democracy and State Capacity: Exploring a J-Shaped Relationship." *Governance* 21 (1): 1–24.
<https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1468-0491.2007.00383.x>.
- Bågenholm, Andreas. 2013. "Throwing the Rascals out? The Electoral Effects of Corruption Allegations and Corruption Scandals in Europe 1981–2011." *Crime, Law and Social Change* 60 (5): 595–609.
<https://doi.org/10.1007/s10611-013-9482-6>.
- Bauhr, Monika, and Nicholas Charron. 2017. "Insider or Outsider? Grand Corruption and Electoral Accountability." *Comparative Political Studies*, June, 0010414017710258.
<https://doi.org/10.1177/0010414017710258>.
- Bauhr, Monika, and Marcia Grimes. 2014. "Indignation or Resignation: The Implications of Transparency for Societal Accountability." *Governance* 27 (2): 291–320.
<https://doi.org/10.1111/gove.12033>.
- BBC. 2018. "A Quick Guide to Brazil's Scandals." *BBC News*, April 8, 2018, sec. Latin America & Caribbean.
<https://www.bbc.com/news/world-latin-america-35810578>.
- Becker, Gary S. 1968. "Crime and Punishment: An Economic Approach." *Journal of Political Economy* 76 (2): 169–217.
<https://doi.org/10.1086/259394>.
- Broms, Rasmus. 2018. "The Electoral Consequences of Institutional Failure: A Comparative Study of Audits, Rulers, and Voters in Swedish Municipalities." Working Paper Series 2018:11.
https://qog.pol.gu.se/digitalAssets/1709/1709807_2018_11_broms.pdf.
- Broms, Rasmus, Carl Dahlström, and Mihály Fazekas. 2017. "Procurement and Competition in Swedish Municipalities." *Quality of Government Working papers* 2017:5.
- Brunetti, Aymo, and Beatrice Weder. 2003. "A Free Press Is Bad News for Corruption." *Journal of Public Economics* 87 (7–8): 1801–24.
- Buscaglia, Edgardo, and Jan van Dijk. 2003. "Controlling Organized Crime and Corruption in the Public Sector." *Forum on Crime and Society* 3 (1): 3–34.
- Carreras, Miguel. 2017. "Institutions, Governmental Performance and the Rise of Political Newcomers." *European Journal of Political Research* 56 (2): 364–80. <https://doi.org/10.1111/1475-6765.12181>.
- Carreras, Miguel, and Sofia Vera. 2018. "Do Corrupt Politicians Mobilize or Demobilize Voters? A Vignette Experiment in Colombia." *Latin American Politics and Society* 60 (3): 77–95.
<https://doi.org/10.1017/lap.2018.25>.
- Charron, Nicholas. 2009. "The Impact of Socio-Political Integration and Press Freedom on Corruption." *Journal of Development Studies* 45 (9): 1472–93.
<https://doi.org/10.1080/00220380902890243>.
- Charron, Nicholas, and Andreas Bågenholm. 2016. "Ideology, Party Systems and Corruption Voting in European Democracies." *Electoral Studies* 41 (March): 35–49.
<https://doi.org/10.1016/j.electstud.2015.11.022>.

- Chayes, Sarah. 2016. *Thieves of State: Why Corruption Threatens Global Security*. 1 edition. W. W. Norton & Company.
- Chong, Alberto, Ana L. De La O, Dean Karlan, and Leonard Wantchekon. 2011. "Looking Beyond the Incumbent: The Effects of Exposing Corruption on Electoral Outcomes." Working Paper 17679. National Bureau of Economic Research.
<http://www.nber.org/papers/w17679>.
- Chowdhury, Shyamal. 2004. "The Effect of Democracy and Press Freedom on Corruption: An Empirical Test" 85 (1): 93–101.
- Cingolani, Luciana, Kaj Thomsson, and Denis Crombrughe de. 2015. "Minding Weber More Than Ever? The Impacts of State Capacity and Bureaucratic Autonomy on Development Goals." *World Development* 72: 191–207.
- Collier, David, and Steven Levitsky. 1997. "Democracy with Adjectives: Conceptual Innovation in Comparative Research." *World Politics* 49 (03): 430–451. <https://doi.org/10.1353/wp.1997.0009>.
- Dahlberg, Stefan and Soren Holmberg. 2014a. "The Importance of Institutional Trust for Regime Support." Working paper. Quality of Government Institute.
- Dahlberg, Stefan, and Sören Holmberg. 2014b. "Democracy and Bureaucracy: How Their Quality Matters for Popular Satisfaction." *West European Politics* 37 (3): 515–37.
<https://doi.org/10.1080/01402382.2013.830468>.
- Dahlström, Carl, and Victor Lapuente. 2017. *Organizing Leviathan: Politicians, Bureaucrats, and the Making of Good Government*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Dimant, Eugen, and Guglielmo Tosato. 2018. "Causes and Effects of Corruption: What Has Past Decade's Empirical Research Taught Us? A Survey." *Journal of Economic Surveys* 32 (2): 335–56.
<https://doi.org/10.1111/joes.12198>.
- Drury, A. Cooper, Jonathan Kriekhaus, and Michael Lusztig. 2006. "Corruption, Democracy, and Economic Growth." *International Political Science Review* 27 (2): 121–36.
<https://doi.org/10.1177/0192512106061423>.
- Elbasani, Arolda, and Senada Šelo Šabić. 2017. "Rule of Law, Corruption and Democratic Accountability in the Course of EU Enlargement." *Journal of European Public Policy* 0 (0): 1–19.
<https://doi.org/10.1080/13501763.2017.1315162>.
- Ercan, Selen A., and Jean-Paul Gagnon. 2014. "The Crisis of Democracy: Which Crisis? Which Democracy?" *Democratic Theory* 1 (2): 1–10.
<https://doi.org/10.3167/dt.2014.010201>.
- Esarey, Justin, and Leslie A. Schwindt-Bayer. 2018. "Women's Representation, Accountability and Corruption in Democracies." *British Journal of Political Science* 48 (3): 659–90.
<https://doi.org/10.1017/S0007123416000478>.
- Faughnan, Brian M., Jonathan T. Hiskey, and Scott D. Revey. 2014. "Subnational Electoral Contexts and Corruption in Mexico." *Journal of Politics in Latin America* 6 (1): 45–81.
- Fazekas, Mihály, István János Tóth, and Lawrence Peter King. 2016. "An Objective Corruption Risk Index Using Public Procurement Data." *European Journal on Criminal Policy and Research* 22 (3): 369–97.
<https://doi.org/10.1007/s10610-016-9308-z>.
- Fernández-Vázquez, Pablo, Pablo Barberá, and Gonzalo Rivero. 2016. "Rooting Out Corruption or Rooting for Corruption? The Heterogeneous Electoral Consequences of Scandals*." *Political Science Research and Methods* 4 (2): 379–97.
<https://doi.org/10.1017/psrm.2015.8>.
- Goldberg, Felix. 2018. "Corruption and Lobbying: Conceptual Differentiation and Gray Areas." *Crime, Law and Social Change* 70 (2): 197–215.
<https://doi.org/10.1007/s10611-017-9727-x>.
- Golden, Miriam A., and Eric C. C. Chang. 2001. "Competitive Corruption: Factional Conflict and Political Malfeasance in Postwar Italian Christian Democracy." *World Politics* 53 (4): 588–622.
- Goldsmith, Arthur A. 1999. "Slapping the Grasping Hand: Correlates of Political Corruption in Emerging Markets." *The American Journal of Economics and Sociology* 58 (4): 865–83.
- Grimes, Marcia. 2013. "The Contingencies of Societal Accountability: Examining the Link Between Civil Society and Good Government." *Studies in Comparative International Development* 48 (4): 380–402. <https://doi.org/10.1007/s12116-012-9126-3>.
- Guiso, Luigi, Paola Sapienza, and Luigi Zingales. 2010. "Civic Capital as the Missing Link." *National Bureau of Economic Research Working Paper Series* No. 15845. <http://www.nber.org/papers/w15845>.
- Hanley, Seán, and Allan Sikk. 2016a. "Economy, Corruption or Floating Voters? Explaining the

Breakthroughs of Anti-Establishment Reform Parties in Eastern Europe." *Party Politics* 22 (4): 522–33. <https://doi.org/10.1177/1354068814550438>.

Hanley, Seán, and Allan Sikk. 2016b. "Economy, Corruption or Floating Voters? Explaining the Breakthroughs of Anti-Establishment Reform Parties in Eastern Europe." *Party Politics* 22 (4): 522–33. <https://doi.org/10.1177/1354068814550438>.

Herrera, Veronica. 2017. *Water and Politics: Clientelism and Reform in Urban Mexico*. University of Michigan Press.

Holmberg, Sören, and Bo Rothstein. 2011. "Dying of Corruption." *Health Economics, Policy and Law* 6 (4): 529–47. <https://doi.org/10.1017/S174413311000023X>.

Howe, Paul. 2017. "Eroding Norms and Democratic Deconsolidation." *Journal of Democracy* 28 (4): 15–29. <https://doi.org/10.1353/jod.2017.0061>.

Johnston, M. 2005. *Civil Society and Corruption: Mobilizing for Reform*. Edited by Michael Johnston. Lanham, Md: University Press of America.

Johnston, Michael. 2013. *Corruption, Contention, and Reform: The Power of Deep Democratization*. Cambridge University Press.

Khemani, Stuti. 2015. "Buying Votes versus Supplying Public Services: Political Incentives to under-Invest in pro-Poor Policies." *Journal of Development Economics* 117 (November): 84–93. <https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jdeveco.2015.07.002>.

Klašnja, Marko. 2015. "Corruption and the Incumbency Disadvantage: Theory and Evidence." *The Journal of Politics* 77 (4): 928–42. <https://doi.org/10.1086/682913>.

Kolstad, Ivar, and Arne Wiig. 2016. "Does Democracy Reduce Corruption?" *Democratization* 23 (7): 1198–1215. <https://doi.org/10.1080/13510347.2015.1071797>.

Kossow, Niklas, and Roberto Martínez Barranco Kukutschka. 2017. "Civil Society and Online Connectivity: Controlling Corruption on the Net?" *Crime, Law and Social Change* 68 (4): 459–76. <https://doi.org/10.1007/s10611-017-9696-0>.

Kotera, Go, Keisuke Okada, and Sovannroeun Samreth. 2012. "Government Size, Democracy, and Corruption: An Empirical Investigation." *Economic Modelling* 29 (6): 2340–48. <https://doi.org/10.1016/j.econmod.2012.06.022>.

Kunicová, Jana, and Susan Rose-Ackerman. 2005. "Electoral Rules and Constitutional Structures as Constraints on Corruption." *British Journal of Political Science* 35 (04): 573–606. <https://doi.org/10.1017/S0007123405000311>.

Lambsdorff, Johann Graf. 2002. "Making Corrupt Deals: Contracting in the Shadow of the Law." *Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization* 48 (3): 221–41. [https://doi.org/10.1016/S0167-2681\(01\)00217-7](https://doi.org/10.1016/S0167-2681(01)00217-7).

Lambsdorff, Johann Graf. 2012. "Behavioral and Experimental Economics as a Guidance to Anticorruption." In *New Advances in Experimental Research on Corruption*, 276–300. Bingley: Emerald Books.

Lauth, Hans-Joachim. 2000. "Informal Institutions and Democracy." *Democratization* 7 (4): 21–50. <https://doi.org/10.1080/13510340008403683>.

Lindstedt, Catharina, and Daniel Naurin. 2010. "Transparency Is Not Enough: Making Transparency Effective in Reducing Corruption." *International Political Science Review* 31 (3): 301–22. <https://doi.org/10.1177/0192512110377602>.

Magalhães, Pedro C. 2016. "Economic Evaluations, Procedural Fairness, and Satisfaction with Democracy." *Political Research Quarterly* 69 (3): 522–34. <https://doi.org/10.1177/1065912916652238>.

Mares, Isabela, and Lauren Young. 2016. "Buying, Expropriating, and Stealing Votes." SSRN Scholarly Paper ID 2779564. Rochester, NY: Social Science Research Network. <https://papers.ssrn.com/abstract=2779564>.

Mares, Isabela, and Boliang Zhu. 2015. "The Production of Electoral Intimidation: Economic and Political Incentives." *Comparative Politics* 48 (1): 23–41.

Marquette, Heather, and Caryn Peiffer. 2015. "Corruption and Collective Action." The Developmental Leadership Program (DLP).

Martini, Maira. 2016. "Brazil: Overview of Corruption and Anti-Corruption." Transparency International Secretariat Policy and Research Department. https://www.transparency.org/files/content/corruption_qas/Brazil_overview_of_corruption_and_anticorruption_2016.pdf.

Mechkova, Valeriya, Anna Lührmann, and Staffan I. Lindberg. 2017. "How Much Democratic Backsliding?" 28 (4): 162–69.

- Merkel, Wolfgang. 2004. "Embedded and Defective Democracies." *Democratization* 11 (5): 33–58.
<https://doi.org/10.1080/13510340412331304598>.
- Merkel, Wolfgang. 2014. "Is There a Crisis of Democracy?" *Democratic Theory* 1 (2): 11–25.
<https://doi.org/10.3167/dt.2014.010202>.
- Montero, José Ramón, Pablo Barberá, Raul Gomez, Juan Antonio Mayoral, and Pedro Riera. 2011. "Las Elecciones Municipales En España: ¿más Allá Del Modelo de Las Elecciones de Segundo Orden?" Ayudas a la Investigación Sociológica Centros de Investigaciones Sociológicas.
- Montes, G. C., and P. C. Paschoal. 2016. "Corruption: What Are the Effects on Government Effectiveness? Empirical Evidence Considering Developed and Developing Countries." *Applied Economics Letters* 23 (2): 146–50.
<https://doi.org/10.1080/13504851.2015.1058900>.
- Montinola, Gabriella R., and Robert W. Jackman. 2002. "Sources of Corruption: A Cross-Country Study." *British Journal of Political Science* 32 (1): 147–70.
<https://doi.org/10.1017/S0007123402000066>.
- Morlino, Leonardo. 2004. "What Is a 'Good' Democracy?" *Democratization* 11 (5): 10–32.
<https://doi.org/10.1080/13510340412331304589>.
- Moss, Todd, Gunilla Pettersson, and Nicolas van de Walle. 2006. "An Aid-Institutions Paradox? A Review Essay on Aid Dependency and State Building in Sub-Saharan Africa." Center for Global Development.
- Mounk, Yascha, and Jordan Kyle. 2018. "What 46 Populist Leaders Did to Democracy - The Atlantic." December 18, 2018.
<https://www.theatlantic.com/ideas/archive/2018/12/hard-data-populism-bolsonaro-trump/578878/>.
- Munck, Gerardo L. 2016. "What Is Democracy? A Reconceptualization of the Quality of Democracy." *Democratization* 23 (1): 1–26.
<https://doi.org/10.1080/13510347.2014.918104>.
- Mungiu-Pippidi, Alina. 2013. "Controlling Corruption by Collective Action." *Journal of Democracy* 24 (1): 101–15.
- Mungiu-Pippidi, Alina. 2015a. "Corruption: Good Governance Powers Innovation." *Nature News* 518 (7539): 295.
<https://doi.org/10.1038/518295a>.
- Mungiu-Pippidi, Alina. 2015b. *The Quest for Good Governance*. Cambridge University Press.
- Mungiu-Pippidi, Alina, and Michael Johnston. 2017. *Transitions to Good Governance: Creating Virtuous Circles of Anticorruption*. Northampton, MA: Edward Elgar Pub.
- Norris, Pippa. 2012. *Making Democratic Governance Work: How Regimes Shape Prosperity, Welfare, and Peace*. Cambridge University Press.
- Nyblade, Benjamin, and Steven R. Reed. 2008. "Who Cheats? Who Loots? Political Competition and Corruption in Japan, 1947–1993." *American Journal of Political Science* 52 (4): 926–41.
<https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1540-5907.2008.00351.x>.
- Peixoto, Tiago. 2012. "The Uncertain Relationship between Open Data and Accountability: A Response to Yu and Robinson's the New Ambiguity of Open Government." *UCLA Law Review Discourse* 60: 200.
- Peixoto, Tiago, and Jonathan Fox. 2016. "When Does ICT-Enabled Citizen Voice Lead to Government Responsiveness?" World development report, World Bank.
- Persson, Anna, and Bo Rothstein. 2014. "It Is My Money: Why Big Government May Be Good Government." QoG institute working papers.
- Persson, Anna, Bo Rothstein, and Jan Teorell. 2013. "Why Anticorruption Reforms Fail—Systemic Corruption as a Collective Action Problem." *Governance* 26 (3): 449–71.
- Pinto, Pablo M., and Boliang Zhu. 2016. "Fortune or Evil? The Effect of Inward Foreign Direct Investment on Corruption." *International Studies Quarterly* 60 (4): 693–705. <https://doi.org/10.1093/isq/sqw025>.
- Porta, Donatella della, Salvatore Sberna, and Alberto Vannucci. 2015. "Bribery in Healthcare: The Organization of Political Corruption in the Healthcare Sector." *Social Policies*, no. 2.
<https://doi.org/10.7389/80420>.
- Porta, Donatella della, and Alberto Vannucci. 2012. *The Hidden Order of Corruption: An Institutional Approach*. Routledge.
- Porta, Donatella Della, and Alberto Vanucci. 1997. "The 'Perverse Effects' of Political Corruption." *Political Studies* 45: 516–38.
- Povitkina, Marina. 2018. "The Limits of Democracy in Tackling Climate Change." *Environmental Politics* 27

(3): 411–32.

<https://doi.org/10.1080/09644016.2018.1444723>.

Putnam, Robert D. 2000. *Bowling Alone: The Collapse and Revival of American Community*. New York: Simon and Schuster.

Putnam, Robert D., Lewis Feldstein, and Donald J. Cohen. 2004. *Better Together: Restoring the American Community*. New York: Simon & Schuster.

Putnam, Robert D., Robert Leonardi, and Raffaella Y. Nanetti. 1994. *Making Democracy Work: Civic Traditions in Modern Italy*. New Jersey: Princeton University Press.

Rahman, Kaunain. 2019. *The Gambia: Overview of Corruption and Anti-Corruption*. <https://knowledgehub.transparency.org/helpdesk/the-gambia-overview-of-corruption-and-anti-corruption>

Reinikka, Ritva, and Jakob Svensson. 2005. "Fighting Corruption to Improve Schooling: Evidence from a Newspaper Campaign in Uganda" 3 (2–3): 259–67.

Riera, Pedro, Pablo Barberá, Raúl Gómez, Juan Antonio Mayoral, and José Ramón Montero. 2013. "The Electoral Consequences of Corruption Scandals in Spain." *Crime, Law and Social Change* 60 (5): 515–34. <https://doi.org/10.1007/s10611-013-9479-1>.

Rock, Michael T. 2009. "Corruption and Democracy." *The Journal of Development Studies* 45 (1): 55–75. <https://doi.org/10.1080/00220380802468579>.

Rose-Ackerman, Susan. 1975. "The Economics of Corruption." *Journal of Public Economics* 4 (2): 187–203. [https://doi.org/10.1016/0047-2727\(75\)90017-1](https://doi.org/10.1016/0047-2727(75)90017-1).

Rose-Ackerman, Susan, and Bonie J. Palifka. 2018. "Corruption, Organized Crime, and Money Laundering." In , edited by Kaushik Basu and Tito Cordella, 75–111. New York: Palgrave Macmillan.

Rose, Richard, and Caryn Peiffer. 2015. *Paying Bribes for Public Services: A Global Guide to Grass-Roots Corruption*. Palgrave Pivot. Basingstoke, Hampshire ; New York: Palgrave Macmillan.

Rose, Richard, and Caryn Peiffer. 2019. "Getting What You Want from Governance." In *Bad Governance and Corruption*, 21–37. Political Corruption and Governance. Palgrave Macmillan, Cham. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-92846-3_2.

Rose-Ackerman, Susan and Palifka, Bonnie. J. 2016. *Corruption and Government: Causes,*

Consequences, and Reform (Second Edition). New York: Cambridge University Press.

Rose-Ackerman, Susan. 1999. "Political Corruption and Democracy." *Faculty Scholarship Series*, January. https://digitalcommons.law.yale.edu/fss_papers/592.

Rothstein, Bo. 2011. "Anti-Corruption: The Indirect 'Big Bang' Approach." *Review of International Political Economy* 18 (2): 228–50.

Rothstein, Bo. 2014. "What Is the Opposite of Corruption?" *Third World Quarterly* 35 (5): 737–52. <https://doi.org/10.1080/01436597.2014.921424>.

Rothstein, Bo. 2015. "The Chinese Paradox of High Growth and Low Quality of Government: The Cadre Organization Meets Max Weber". *Governance*.

Rothstein, Bo. 2017. "Human Well-Being and the Lost Relevance of Political Science." In *The Relevance of Political Science*. Palgrave Macmillan.

Rothstein, Bo and Dietlind Stolle. 2009. "The State and Social Capital: An Institutional Theory of Generalized Trust." *Comparative Politics* 40 (4): 441–67.

Rothstein, Bo and Jan Teorell. 2015. "Getting to Sweden, Part II: Breaking with Corruption in the 19th Century." *Scandinavian Political Studies* 38 (3): 238–54.

Rothstein, Bo and Eric M. Uslaner. 2005. "All for One: Equality, Corruption, and Social Trust." *World Politics* 58 (1): 41–72.

Schmitter, Philippe C., and Terry Lynn Karl. 1991. "What Democracy Is. . . and Is Not." *Journal of Democracy* 2 (3): 75–88. <https://doi.org/10.1353/jod.1991.0033>.

Spada, Paolo, Jonathan Mellon, Tiago Peixoto and Fredrik M. Sjöberg. 2016. "Effects of the Internet on Participation: Study of a Public Policy Referendum in Brazil." *Journal of Information Technology & Politics* 13 (3): 187–207. <https://doi.org/10.1080/19331681.2016.1162250>.

Stensöta, Helena and Lena Wängnerud. 2018. "Why Expect a Link Between Gender and Corruption?" In *Gender and Corruption*, 3–20. Political Corruption and Governance. Palgrave Macmillan, Cham. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-70929-1_1.

Stockemer, Daniel, Bernadette LaMontagne and Lyle Scruggs. 2013. "Bribes and Ballots: The Impact of Corruption on Voter Turnout in Democracies."

International Political Science Review 34 (1): 74–90.
<https://doi.org/10.1177/0192512111419824>.

Stockhammer, Engelbert. 2017. “Determinants of the Wage Share: A Panel Analysis of Advanced and Developing Economies.” *British Journal of Industrial Relations* 55 (1): 3–33.
<https://doi.org/10.1111/bjir.12165>.

Stokes, Susan C., Thad Dunning, Marcelo Nazareno and Valeria Brusco. 2013. *Brokers, Voters, and Clientelism: The Puzzle of Distributive Politics*. New York: Cambridge University Press.

Sundström, Aksel. 2015. “Covenants with Broken Swords: Corruption and Law Enforcement in Governance of the Commons.” *Global Environmental Change* 31 (March): 253–62.
<https://doi.org/10.1016/j.gloenvcha.2015.02.002>.

Sung, H.-E. 2004. “Democracy and Political Corruption: A Cross-National Comparison.” *Crime, Law and Social Change* 41 (2): 179–93.
<https://doi.org/10.1023/B:CRIS.0000016225.75792.02>.

Tavits, Margit. 2007. “Clarity of Responsibility and Corruption.” *American Journal of Political Science* 51 (1): 218–229.
<https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1540-5907.2007.00246.x>.

Uslaner, Eric M., and Bo Rothstein. 2016. “The Historical Roots of Corruption: State Building, Economic Inequality, and Mass Education.” Text. January 2016.
<https://doi.org/info:doi/10.5129/001041516817037736>.

Vampa, Davide. 2015. “Local Representative Democracy and Protest Politics: The Case of the Five-Star Movement.” *Contemporary Italian Politics*, September, 1–19.
<https://doi.org/10.1080/23248823.2015.1087120>.

Vannucci, Alberto, and Salvatore Sberna. 2013. “Le Mani Sulle Città: Corruzione e Infiltrazioni Criminali Nee Governo Del Territorio.”

Voigt, Stefan and Jerg Gutmann. 2015. “On the Wrong Side of the Law – Causes and Consequences of a Corrupt Judiciary.” *International Review of Law and Economics* 43 (August): 156–66.
<https://doi.org/10.1016/j.irle.2014.04.005>.

Warren, Mark E. 2004a. “What Does Corruption Mean in a Democracy?” *American Journal of Political Science* 48 (2): 328–43.
<https://doi.org/10.2307/1519886>.

Warren, Mark E. 2004b. “What Does Corruption Mean in a Democracy? When Compared to Other Pathologies Of.” *American Journal of Political Science* 48 (2): 328–43.

Weitz-Shapiro, Rebecca. 2012. “What Wins Votes: Why Some Politicians Opt Out of Clientelism.” *American Journal of Political Science* 56 (3): 568–83.
<https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1540-5907.2011.00578.x>.

Winters, Matthew S., and Rebecca Weitz-Shapiro. 2013. “Lacking Information or Condoning Corruption: When Do Voters Support Corrupt Politicians?” *Comparative Politics* 45 (4): 418–36.
<http://www.jstor.org/stable/43664074>.

Ziblatt, Daniel. 2009. “Shaping Democratic Practice and the Causes of Electoral Fraud: The Case of Nineteenth-Century Germany.” *American Political Science Review* 103 (1): 1–21.
<https://doi.org/10.1017/S0003055409090042>.

Zyglidopoulos, Stelios. 2016. “Toward a Theory of Second-Order Corruption.” *Journal of Management Inquiry* 25 (1): 3–10.
<https://doi.org/10.1177/1056492615579914>.

“Anti-Corruption Helpdesk Answers provide practitioners around the world with rapid on-demand briefings on corruption. Drawing on publicly available information, the briefings present an overview of a particular issue and do not necessarily reflect Transparency International’s official position.”

*Transparency International
International Secretariat
Alt-Moabit 96
10559 Berlin
Germany*

*Phone: +49 - 30 - 34 38 200
Fax: +49 - 30 - 34 70 39 12*

*tihelpdesk@transparency.org
www.transparency.org*

*blog.transparency.org
facebook.com/transparencyinternational
twitter.com/anticorruption*

*Transparency International chapters can use the Helpdesk free.
Email us at **tihelpdesk@transparency.org***