Overview of corruption and anti-corruption in Pacific Island countries

Pacific Island countries are diverse in geography, size, population, political and economic systems. Hence, attempts to extrapolate corruption trends from such a diverse group of states is somewhat problematic, and care should be taken to avoid generalisations. Nonetheless, some countries share common characteristics, such as reliance on natural resources, narrowly-based economies, remoteness from major markets and vulnerability to external shocks such as a health crisis. These common characteristics make them susceptible to various forms of corruption, including nepotism, cronyism, political corruption and external political manipulation from powerful countries. Corruption is rife in various sectors, including natural resources, public services and constituency development funds. In a bid to increase transparency and accountability, various international donors have launched anti-corruption initiatives, with some programmes intersecting or supporting initiatives run by national governments.

RELATION U4 MATERIAL

Corruption challenges in small island developing states in the Pacific region

Solomon Islands: Overview of corruption and anti-corruption

Reciprocity networks, service delivery, and corruption: The wantok system in Papua New Guinea

Papua New Guinea: overview of corruption and anti-corruption
Query

Please provide an overview of corruption and anti-corruption in the Pacific region. What are the anti-corruption programmes by donors in the Pacific Island countries, and which programmes are achieving the best outcomes? Our main interest is on the Melanesian countries (PNG, Fiji, Solomon Islands, Vanuatu), the microstates (Kiribati, Tuvalu, Nauru), Samoa and Tonga.

Contents

1. Background and regional trends
2. Country profiles
   a. Papua New Guinea
   b. Fiji
   c. Solomon Islands
   d. Vanuatu
   e. Kiribati
   f. Tuvalu
   g. Nauru
   h. Samoa
   i. Tonga
3. Anti-corruption programmes by donors
4. Annex: regional overview of governance performance
5. References

Caveat

There are very few publicly available sources of information on corruption in some Pacific Island countries, with no recent datasets and profiles about the state of corruption and anti-corruption.

Background and regional trends

Pacific Island countries are jurisdictions found in the Pacific Ocean, consisting of three main groups of island countries: Micronesia, Melanesia and Polynesia (West and Forster 2016). The Micronesian group consists of small islands found north of the equator and comprise of Palau, Nauru, Marshall Islands, Kiribati and Federated States of Micronesia. The Melanesian group consists of island countries found northeast of Australia and south of the equator, and includes Fiji, Vanuatu, the Solomon
Islands and Papua New Guinea. Polynesian countries are found to the east of the Pacific and include Tuvalu, Wallis and Futuna, Tokelau, Samoa, American Samoa, Tonga, Niue, the Cook Islands and French Polynesia (West and Forster 2016).

Most countries in the region were previously under colonial leadership. It is only a few decades ago that many countries achieved independence, hence formal democratic structures and political institutions are still relatively new and overlaid on traditional systems of governance (Fraenkel 2013).

Regional efforts have been put in place to advance collective political and economic development. The Pacific Islands Forum is the region’s premier political and economic policy organisation, which was founded in 1971 and comprises 18 member states. In 2018, it launched the Pacific Roadmap for Sustainable Development that provides guidelines for the regional responses to achieve the 2030 Agenda and the Sustainable Development Goals within the context of national plans and priorities (Pacific Islands Forum 2018). The forum members are currently developing the 2050 Strategy for the Blue Pacific Continent, which aims to refine the region’s vision of peace, harmony, security, social inclusion and prosperity (Pacific Islands Forum 2020).

Regional trends

There is great diversity across the Pacific Island countries in areas such as geography, size, culture, economies and political systems (UNDP 2017). Some countries such as Papua New Guinea have a large population of around 8 million, whereas Tuvalu and Nauru have estimated populations around 11,000 each (World Bank 2020a). Kiribati, for instance, features as one of the most remote and geographically dispersed countries in the world, consisting of more than 30 coral atolls spread over 3.5 million square kilometres of ocean – a geographical area larger than India (World Bank 2020a). On the world economy, some countries such as Fiji, Papua New Guinea, Samoa are listed as developing economies, whereas Kiribati, Tuvalu, the Solomon Islands and Vanuatu are listed as least developed countries (United Nations 2019). Hence, it is important to note such variations among Pacific countries to avoid generalisations on governance issues.

Nonetheless, some Pacific countries share a set of common characteristics, such as limited natural resources, narrowly-based economies, remoteness from major markets and vulnerability to external shocks, such as a health crisis (World Bank 2020a; Walton and Dinnen 2019: 419). These sets of common characteristics have contributed to the countries’ development challenges, together with poor governance (Chêne 2010: 2).

The small populations and cultural ties in some Pacific Island communities encourage informal social networks that offer critical support to local communities amid a weak state (Walton and Jackson 2020). For instance, the wantok system in Papua New Guinea, which is a common system of reciprocity, is instrumental in offering “social protection when the state fails to supply basic social services” as politicians and public officials provide much-needed resources to their local communities (Walton and Jackson 2020: 8). However, such social networks also risk supporting a culture of nepotism and unfair distribution of resources to certain groups where state resources and positions are shared with kin and family (Hanich and Tsamenyi 2009: 389; Walton and Jackson 2020: 8). In addition, small communities increase the risks of conflict of interest due to the close connection between people in both private and public spheres.

Social cohesion, fragmentation and isolation in the islands contribute to a culture where loyalty to local

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1 Including Fiji, Kiribati, Nauru, Papua New Guinea, Samoa, Solomon Islands, Tonga, Tuvalu and Vanuatu. See https://www.forumsec.org/who-we-arepacific-islands-forum/
groups is regarded as more important than loyalty to state institutions (UNODC 2016a: 12). While this may vary from one country to another, public officials in some countries are usually expected to channel state resources back to their communities, and appointments and promotions in government are gained through nepotism and cronyism (Walton 2019a). Refusing a request from a member of the social group can result in the fracture of esteemed social ties (Walton and Jackson 2020: 8).

**Forms of corruption**

Corruption in the Pacific islands manifests itself in various forms and sectors, leading to underperformance in the public sector and undermining capacity for the countries to deliver public services to citizens (Chêne 2010: 3).

The most common forms of corruption in the Pacific Island countries range from bureaucratic and administrative corruption as government officials abuse their powers for private gains (Chêne 2010: 3) to political corruption, such as vote buying and illegal payments between candidates (for instance, not to contest against each other or to switch allegiances) (Hassall 2017: 16). Patron-client relationships are common both in the private and public sectors, and a study showed that clientelist politics in the region have contributed to slower economic growth (Duncan and Hassall 2011).

It is a common cultural practice to give gifts in the region, but that poses corruption challenges (UNDP 2008: 21). Traditional gift-giving, such as *bubuti* (distribution of resources within the extended family) and *matai* gifts (to traditional chiefs) have been extended to contemporary political relationships, including during elections, which can be regarded as vote buying (Hassall 2017: 10). However, some argue that cultural gift-giving systems in the region have been misunderstood due to Western influence (Lamour 2012: 11). For instance, when a fishing crew gives a fish to the inspection officer in some Pacific Island communities, locals see it more as a traditional gesture of hospitality than giving a bribe (UNODC 2019: 10).

Political leaders and local and transnational networks usually engage in money laundering across borders, with Australia the most likely destination (Walton and Dinnen 2019: 421). In 2012, the new head of Papua New Guinea’s new anti-corruption unit Task Force Sweep compared Australia as the “Cayman Islands” of the Pacific, alleging its role as a safe haven for proceeds of crime from Papua New Guinea (Mason 2012). Also, an investigation by the Global Witness and Australian media outlets Fairfax and SBS found that proceeds of corruption are laundered between Papua New Guinea and Australia with help from professional enablers, such as bankers, real-estate agents and lawyers who run the money laundering schemes (McKenzie et al. 2015).

**Sectors**

Natural resources, such as petroleum and minerals in PNG, are a key determinant of economic growth in the island countries along with nature (tourism) in Fiji and Vanuatu as well as logging in Solomon Islands — but unfortunately corruption is a major concern (Walton and Dinnen 2019: 421; Chêne 2010: 3). This includes corruption by big corporations to shape laws, policies and regulations to their advantage, or corruption by public officials and politicians who run their own “off-the-book” businesses (UNDP 2008: 7).

Transnational criminal groups use various corrupt means to exploit natural resources, such as bribery and co-option of environmental law enforcement officers, making logging, fishing and mining highly corruption prone sectors (UNODC 2016b). According to Walton and Dinnen (2019: 419), the leading type of “organised criminal groups” involves elite politicians, government officials, private sector elites and intermediaries who exploit natural resources in the region, often with impunity. An example is the Solomon Islands where many senior
leaders have direct interest in logging concessions and there is collusion between political leaders, government officials and the timber industry that has resulted in the obscuring of legal and illegal logging or trading (UNODC 2013: 93).

Public services, such as health, education, police, borders and customs administration, are also prone to corruption (Barcham 2007). According to the 2008 Asia-Pacific Human Development Report “Tackling Corruption, Transforming Lives”, corruption in public services has resulted in poor people finding themselves excluded from basic needs they cannot afford or being asked to pay to gain access to public services to which they already have a right (UNDP 2008: 4-6).

Some countries provide constituency development funds controlled by MPs to help them develop and deliver programmes, projects and activities in the communities that they represent. However, these are prone to abuse by the responsible authorities and create opportunities for corruption and nepotism (Batley 2015). Corruption is a concern in these development fund programmes, particularly when there is no effective oversight to hold politicians accountable for how they have used the funds (Cain 2017).

Foreign aid may come tied with agreements for the exploitation of natural resources (particularly from donors who are less demanding on good governance) or with other political objectives (Hanich and Tsamenyi 2009: 389-390). Further, in some countries, such as the Solomon Islands, anti-corruption commitments are used as an incentive to attract aid from donors, but officials continue to engage in corruption despite anti-corruption reforms (Walton 2019b).
Papua New Guinea

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<th>Control of Corruption Score</th>
<th>Corruption Perceptions Index, score (rank)</th>
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<th>Press Freedom Index (rank)</th>
<th>Freedom House Score</th>
<th>Global Peace Index</th>
<th>UNCAC Status</th>
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**Background**

Papua New Guinea (PNG) gained its independence from Australia in 1975. It consists of mainly rural communities (comprising 80% of the population) that experience substantial difficulty accessing services and markets owing to rugged terrain, poor and unreliable transportation infrastructure, lack of fiscal capacity, mismanagement of state resources and corruption (Bertelsmann Stiftung 2020).

The prime minister heads the government, and cabinet ministers are known to often exercise significant command over their portfolios without necessarily being accountable to the cabinet (Freedom House 2020a). Coalition governments have dominated the PNG political arena since independence. These coalitions often consist of several parties and independents with individual members of parliament easily switching parties and parties switching coalitions (Bertelsmann Stiftung 2020). Last year, in the midst of calls for resignation due to grievances surrounding tensions over a multi-billion dollar gas project signed with French company Total and the US firm ExxonMobil, Peter O’Neill resigned as the prime minister and the former prime minister James Marape took charge (BBC News 2019).

Prime Minister Marape has made anti-corruption a major priority for his tenure, such as committing to bringing forward the legislation to enact the Independent Commission Against Corruption legislation (Transparency International Papua New Guinea 2020), but the effectiveness and drive still needs to be seen. According to a recent study by Walton and Hushang (2020), despite promises to fight corruption, new governments in Papua New Guinea have initially increased budgetary allocations to anti-corruption initiatives but then gradually reduce resources and undermine anti-corruption organisations after accusations of corruption and frustrations in anti-corruption efforts. The authors recommend comprehensive responses from political, civic and diplomatic channels to avoid the decrease in funding for anti-corruption programmes (Walton and Hushang 2020: 200-201).

**Main corruption challenges and institutional framework**

Corruption is widespread, pervasive and remains a serious challenge to development in the country (US Department of State 2019a; Freedom House 2020a; Human Rights Watch 2020). It manifests mainly in the form of grand and petty corruption, and nepotism (Bertelsmann Stiftung 2020). Weak public institutions and governance, lack of transparency, politicisation of the bureaucracy, and misuse of public resources by officials leads to corruption at all levels and in all organs of government (US Department of State 2019a). Though cases are reported, impunity remains an issue as evidenced by the list of unresolved...
corruption cases compiled by Transparency International PNG (2017a). The country is rich in natural and mineral resources, such as crude oil, natural gas, timber, cocoa, coffee, palm oil, gold, copper, silver, nickel and cobalt. However, rent-seeking, corruption and poor governance continue to hinder its successful use of these resources (Avalos et al. 2015). For instance, a survey by Transparency International on corruption risks in mining awards showed that there is a very high risk of community leaders in PNG who are negotiating with a mining company to not represent community members’ interests but their own (Caripis 2017: 16).

While the judiciary remains relatively independent, lower courts suffer from corruption challenges. Moreover, political interference and police corruption are also known to affect justice procedures (US Department of State 2019a). Several members of parliament use their positions to enrich themselves and have been charged with corruption, including former PM O’Neill who faced charges of corruption over the US$14 million purchase of two generators allegedly without parliamentary approval (RNZ 2020b).

Although regular elections take place, they are often marred by irregularities, bribery, voter fraud, voter intimidation and violence (Freedom House 2020a). For instance, there were reports of bribery and intimidation of voters, lack of secret voting and impartial security personnel during 2017 elections (Transparency International Papua New Guinea 2017b). Accusations of corruption have also been levied against the election commission with two electoral officers arrested in 2017, and the election commissioner, who was arrested in 2019 on charges of corruption, money laundering and conspiracy (Blade 2019; Freedom House 2020a).

The government provides significant development funds through the district services improvement programs (DSIPs), which are directly controlled by members of parliament and members of the district development authorities (Howes et al. 2014: 128). However, these constituency development funds are prone to corruption as responsible persons mismanage the funds for personal gains, such as strengthening patronage relationships (Walton 2019c: 363). The auditor general’s DSIP review discovered a number of issues including: “a pervasive breakdown in the DSIP governance framework; and ineffective spending of DSIP grants including potential misuse of DSIP funds” (Auditor-General’s Office of Papua New Guinea 2014: 12).

A recent study also found that public servants are often ill-informed about the laws and rules regarding their roles, and are under immense pressure to provide unofficial favours to businesses, politicians and kith and kin (Walton 2019b). This poses a serious challenge of nepotism and favouritism in the allocation of state resources and positions.

The country has put several anti-corruption instruments in place. For instance, its criminal code of 1974 criminalises corruption offences and the Proceeds of Crime Act of 2005 (amended in 2015) criminalises money laundering and provides measures for asset forfeiture. The parliament unanimously passed the whistleblower act earlier this year 2020 (Tarawa 2020). However, the new law has received criticism for its failure to meet international standards on key issues such as the narrow definition of protected employees, lack of obligations for employers to protect the identity of anonymous whistleblowers and failure to impose penalties on employers for taking retaliation (PNGi 2020).

On anti-corruption agencies, a bill to establish the Independent Commission Against Corruption remains tabled (Bertelsmann Stiftung 2020). Currently, the organisations responsible for curtailting corruption are the Ombudsman.
Commission, the Public Accounts Committee and Fraud and Anti-Corruption Directorate of the Royal Papua New Guinea Constabulary, which has a responsibility to investigate complaints against the police (US Department of State 2020a).
### Fiji

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### Background

Fiji gained its independence in 1970. It experienced political tension and instability after independence, including several military coups – the latest one being in 2006, which placed Commodore Bainimarama as the leader of the country (Wyeth 2018). The new regime launched a “cleanup campaign” to get rid of corruption and racism, leading to the removal of members of parliament and the dismal of several senior officials and heads of statutory bodies and state-owned enterprises (Lamour 2008: 10). The military leaders also invited public complaints on corruption, demanded investigations and later established the Fiji Independent Commission Against Corruption (Lamour 2008: 13-19). However, over time the new leadership was accused of engaging in corrupt activities similar to the preceding one, such as mismanagement, abuse of office and politics of patronage (RNZ 2013).

Fiji was suspended from the Pacific Islands Forum after the coup on the grounds of its governance commitments under the Biketawa Declaration, and it was reinstated only after the 2014 elections (Sauvakacolo 2014). Despite elections being held, participatory democracy by citizens and the political power balance between genders were assessed as relatively weak (Povitkina and Mechkova 2016). The ruling party allegedly still interferes in opposition political parties, undermines judicial independence, and security officials are known for their brutality (Freedom House 2020b).

The 2013 Global Corruption Barometer showed that Fiji citizens were highly willing to engage in anti-corruption work. About 99% of respondents were willing to be actively involved in the fight against corruption, and 97% said they would report an incident of corruption (Transparency International 2013). However, several incidents in recent years indicate that civic space is shrinking in the country. For instance, Civicus (2018) reported on several cases involving citizens and journalists who were arrested for exercising their freedom of speech before the 2018 elections. The 2019 review by the United Nations Human Rights Council also highlighted a lack of progress on civic freedoms and recommended that the country should safeguard the freedom of expression by ensuring that criminal and speech-related laws are not misused to suppress media and civil society (Benedict 2019).

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2 The 2013 Global Corruption Barometer is the latest version to cover Fiji.
Main corruption challenges and institutional framework

Bribery is one of the most common forms of corruption in Fiji (Prakash 2018). The latest World Bank’s Enterprise Survey on Fiji (2009: 9) indicated that corruption was a major problem for corporations, with 5% of firms expected to pay bribes in meetings with tax inspectors or to get a construction permit. In 2017, Fiji’s education minister was charged with bribery and using undue influence after he allegedly offered a steady water source to a high school in exchange for a school manager’s vote (RNZ 2017).

According to the 2013 Global Corruption Barometer, most respondents in Fiji perceived the most corrupt sectors or institutions to be the business sector, political parties, police, public officials and parliament (Transparency International 2013: 36).

High-level officials have faced charges of corruption in recent years. For instance, the former Fijian Ambassador to the United States was charged with one count of obtaining a financial advantage after causing payment to be made to himself from the Washington Embassy funds between 2016 and 2017 (Fiji Independent Commission Against Corruption 2020). The anti-corruption commission also recently investigated allegations of corrupt activities by eight members of parliament for claiming travel and accommodation allowances to which they were not entitled (RNZ 2020a).

There is widespread nepotism and cronyism in Fiji (Wickberg 2013: 3). After the military coup, Global Integrity (2008) reported that appointments, recruitments and promotion in the civil service and state-owned enterprises were mainly based on ethnic or political affiliations and loyalty to Prime Minister Bainimarama’s government. For instance, there were accusations of alleged nepotism in the appointment of the CEO Fiji Broadcasting Corporation Ltd., who was brother of the attorney general (RNZ 2007).

Though little information is available online on recent cases of nepotism, parliamentarians have debated favouritism and nepotism in government, particularly in procurement processes and the issuance of permits by municipal councils (Parliament of the Republic of Fiji 2019). Furthermore, the prime minister seemed to acknowledge the problem of nepotism during his speech before the 2018 United Nations General Assembly, in which he highlighted that Fiji was looking at a future free of racism, nepotism and privilege (United Nations 2018).

Fiji has made several anti-corruption commitments. After the military coup, the new government established the Independent Commission Against Corruption in 2007 with a mandate to spearhead measures to curb corruption in Fiji. In the same year, the Prevention of Bribery Promulgation Act was promulgated and covers bribery offences. In 2008, Fiji ratified UNCAC, followed by the enactment of Crime Decrees Act of 2009 that criminalises misappropriation, embezzlement and other diversion of property by public officials. The Proceeds of Crime (Amendment) Decree was enacted in 2012, and it provides regulation of unexplained wealth and the creation of the Forfeited Assets Fund.
Solomon Islands

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**Background**

The Solomon Islands consists of six major islands and over 900 smaller islands, and it gained independence in 1978. The country experienced civil unrests between 1998 and 2003, known as the Tensions, which were fuelled by the conflicting interests of many heterogeneous tribal clans or groups in the country (McGovern and Choulai 2005; Wilikilagi 2009).

In 2003, the Australian government led a multilateral Regional Assistance Mission to Solomon Islands (RAMSI) in response to a request from the newly elected Solomon Islands government for support in restoration of the rule of law (McGovern and Choulai 2005). According to the Lowy Institute (2014), the Australian government spent around US$2.4 billion on the RAMSI’s three pillars: law and justice, economic governance and machinery of government.

RAMSI officially left in 2017, and the country held democratic elections in 2019, which were commended as peaceful by the Commonwealth observer, though there were calls for improvements in the voter registration process as well as expanded early voting options for diaspora voters and for essential service personnel (Freedom House 2020c).

**Main corruption challenges and institutional framework**

Corruption and abuse of office are major challenges across public institutions. For instance, an auditor general’s report discovered that approximately US$8.6 million in public funds from the financial years 2012 and 2013 remained unaccounted for (Freedom House 2016).

Senior government officials and politicians have been implicated in corruption cases recently. An example is the permanent secretary in the Ministry of Infrastructure Development who was arrested in 2017 for multiple counts of corruption, including awarding contracts to companies owned by his family (Buchanan 2017a). In 2018, a Solomon Islands lawmaker was charged with corruption for allegedly abusing shipping funds worth more than US$374,000 to buy motor-powered canoes for his political supporters (Papachristou 2018). Earlier this year, two members of parliament lost their seats after they were convicted by the high court for bribing voters during the 2019 national elections (Graue 2020).

The 2013 Global Corruption Barometer reported that 34% of respondents in the Solomon Islands had paid bribes in the previous year to access one of eight public services (Transparency International 2013: 34). In addition, the police received the highest percentage (36%) as the most
corrupt institution in the country (Transparency International 2013: 17).

Similar to other small island states, nepotism and patronage systems are a major concern (Corbett 2013: 63). As family and kin play a central role in political dynamics, particularly given financial obligations and pressure from close political supporters, politicians may end up pursuing alternative income streams to generate funds and opportunities for redistribution to these groups (Corbett 2013: 63-65). In 2015, the chief justice publicly pointed out the challenges of nepotism in the country and urged the new government to refrain from appointing “cronies” to key positions (Freedom House 2016).

A source for nepotism and patronage systems is the constituency development funds that are directly controlled by members of parliament for local development. The funds are prone to corruption, as evidenced by corruption charges that were brought against two members of parliament in 2018 for misusing the funds (Wasuka 2018). The control of funds by politicians opens doors for vote buying as voters choose politicians who may provide them with resources, particularly in communities with strong wantok systems (Woods 2019).

According to the Heritage Foundation (2020), corruption is a serious challenge in the judicial, mining and fishing sectors. In addition, illegal logging is a huge concern, with the UNODC (2013: 95) estimating that between 80% and 90% of the formal trade in wood-based products from the country is illegal. In 2018, residents of Nende Island protested against alleged corrupt government practices that had allowed a logging company to obtain a logging licence in the island’s primary forests (Hunt 2019).

On anti-corruption measures, the penal code of 1996 criminalises various corruption offences. The government enacted the Anti-Corruption Act 2 of 2018 was passed. The act establishes the Solomon Islands Independent Commission Against Corruption and sets out the roles of the government, relevant ministries and the commission in preventing corruption, and empowers the commission to investigate and prosecute corruption offences. However, there were calls for concerns by opposition members of parliament regarding the inclusion of local customs as a defence in corruption cases and the non-retroactive application of the law (Freedom House 2020c). The government also passed the Whistleblowers Protection Act of 2018 which protects whistleblowers from liability and victimisation.
Vanuatu

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**Background**

The Republic of Vanuatu gained independence from joint British-French rule in 1980 and currently stands as a parliamentary democracy divided between its English-speaking and French-speaking citizens (Heritage Foundation 2020b). However, it suffers from patterns of unstable coalition governments that are unable to complete their terms (Freedom House 2020d). Such repeated changes of allegiance by members of parliament, as well as tight constraints on when and for how long parliament can sit, continue to have a negative effect on the formulation and implementation of policy in the country (Heritage Foundation 2020b). Moreover, factionalism continues to undermine political stability, making the government vulnerable to corruption (Heritage Foundation 2020b). The judiciary, although mostly independent, lacks the resources to keep hold of qualified staff. It takes an average of 480 days to resolve a dispute (Heritage Foundation 2020b).

The country with its population of 300,000 people is awaiting general election results held on 20 March 2020, which have been delayed because of the COVID-19 pandemic. As social distancing rules made it difficult to have enough observers in one room, the counting of the votes was live-streamed, and official results are to be declared soon (BBC News 2020). After the 20 March 2020 elections, there were 13 election petitions lodged and 5 criminal charges against winning candidates (Malsungai 2020).

**Main corruption challenges and institutional framework**

The major corruption scandal in recent years involved the then deputy Prime Minister Moana Carcasses who was convicted of bribing associate lawmakers to help bring down the previous government (BBC News 2015). Parliament speaker Marcellino Pipite, one of the individuals found guilty, tried to pardon himself and 13 others while serving as acting head of state during an overseas trip by former president Lonsdale (BBC News 2015; Freedom House 2020d). The pardon was overturned on the return of then president Lonsdale, putting, in one sweep, half of the then governing party in jail (BBC News 2015). The 14 lawmakers in question, including Carcasses, were all released on parole in 2017 but remain barred from public office until 2025. In 2019, President Moses announced that he would pardon the lawmakers, and while one was pardoned, the status of the rest remains unchanged (Freedom House 2020d).

The “golden passport scheme” in the country has attracted foreigners, with the total revenue collected from the passport scheme rising from US$33.3 million in 2016 to US$43.9 million in 2017 and US$91.7 million in 2018 (Tax Justice Network 2020: 4). Similar to other passport or visa schemes around the globe, the scheme has drawn
criminals or corrupt persons who use the scheme to hide or launder illicit funds. For instance, a Chinese national who held a Vanuatu passport was accused of arranging the electronic theft of US$81 million from the Central Bank of Bangladesh, which he used in his schemes (Andrade 2016). In 2015, the Asia/Pacific Group on Money Laundering reported that there was lucrative, high-level political corruption in Vanuatu, notably in sales of passports and citizenship (Asia/Pacific Group on Money Laundering 2015: 31). The passport scheme presents opportunities for politically connected persons to sell passports for a price, and at the same time opening doors for the laundering of the proceeds of crime to purchase the passports.

Vanuatu was on the FATF Grey List due to major weaknesses in its anti-money laundering laws, including inadequate customer due diligence and inadequate supervisory frameworks for financial institutions and designated non-financial businesses and professions (FATF 2015). However, it was removed in 2018 after the FATF appraised its progress in the anti-money laundering regime (FATF 2018).

There are various anti-corruption instruments in place. The penal code of 1981 criminalises various acts of corruption, and the leadership code of 1998 covers bribery offences as well. The Proceeds of Crime Act of 2002 (last amended in 2017) criminalises money laundering and provides measures for asset forfeiture. The right to information law came into force in 2017 in the country (Buchanan 2017b). While the law was widely welcomed as a positive step, observers remain concerned about the establishment of fees and other potential obstacles to timely fulfil information requests (Freedom House 2020d). Key institutions involved in the criminalisation of corruption and law enforcement include: the Vanuatu Police Force, Office of the Public Prosecutor, Office of the Ombudsman, Vanuatu Financial Intelligence Unit and the Public Service Commission (UNODC 2016c).
**Kiribati**

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**Background**

Kiribati gained its independence in 1978. It is a multiparty democracy with regular polls and peaceful transfers of power (Freedom House 2020e). The country suffers from a shortage of skilled workers, weak infrastructure, and remoteness from international markets hinder greater development and economic freedom for the island (Heritage Foundation 2020c). Rule of law remains uneven throughout the country (Heritage Foundation 2020c).

The 2018 Butiraoi ferry disaster, which killed 95 people, received widespread public attention and criticism. In particular, there was criticism over the official report, which the government initially refused to make public, but later released it due to pressure (Freedom House 2020e).

**Main corruption challenges and institutional framework**

Official corruption, nepotism, favouritism and other abuses of privilege, based on tribal and church ties, are major issues (US Department of State 2019c). This is exacerbated by poorly resourced oversight bodies that fail to carry out their anti-corruption mandates (Heritage Foundation 2020c).

The economy is reliant on fisheries, as evidenced by the amount from fishing licence revenues in 2015 which totalled US$109 million, or 99% of that year’s gross domestic product (Asian Development Bank 2016: 24). According to the World Bank, Kiribati is one of the world’s most fisheries-dependent countries, and its relies heavily on the sustainability of fisheries and associated coastal ecosystems for its long-term revenue generation and food security (World Bank 2020b).

However, there are high risks of corruption in the fishing industry, particularly in licencing, access agreements, and monitoring and inspection (Hanich and Tsamenyi 2009: 388-391). It occurs at a lower level, where officials are bribed with fish, gifts, holidays or excessive allowances, and at a higher level through large fishery deals, political interference in administrative practices and organised criminal behaviour (Wickberg 2013: 4).

Kiribati’s penal code of 1977 criminalises various acts of corruption. The Proceeds of Crime Act of 2003 criminalises money laundering and provides procedures for asset forfeiture. The country lacks regulations on public asset disclosure for officials, access to government information, and other transparency matters (Freedom House 2020e). The country recently volunteered to host the first Pacific Regional Anti-Corruption Conference, which took place in February 2020, where Pacific leaders, ministers and anti-corruption actors
convened to discuss regional anti-corruption issues. During the conference, the regional leaders endorsed the Teieniwa Vision on anti-corruption, which is a statement on the goals and aspirations of 14 Pacific countries in fighting corruption (Robinson-Drawbridge 2020).
**Tuvalu**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Control of Corruption</th>
<th>Corruption Perceptions Index, score (rank)</th>
<th>The Economist Democracy Index</th>
<th>Press Freedom Index (rank)</th>
<th>Freedom House Score</th>
<th>Global Peace Index</th>
<th>UNCAC Status</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>

**Background**

Tuvalu gained its independence in 1978. It has a population of approximately 11,800 people and consists of low-lying islands, with no point being higher than 4.5m above sea level (BBC News 2018a; Freedom House 2020f). It is a parliamentary democracy with regular elections, and its campaigns against climate change are given priority by local politicians as they argue that the islands could be swamped by rising sea levels (BBC News 2018b).

**Main corruption challenges and institutional framework**

Corruption is not a significant challenge on the island (Freedom House 2020f). However, in the recent past, there have been a few corruption scandals. In 2016, former prime minister Ielemia was convicted of receiving over US$15,000 from Japanese and Taiwanese sources while in office and depositing the money in a personal bank account (RNZ 2016). The conviction was overturned by a higher court a few weeks later. Nevertheless, the fact that Ielemia had started serving a prison term led to his removal from parliament (Freedom House 2020f).

There are various anti-corruption instruments in place. The penal code of 1965 (amended in 2016) criminalises corruption offences, whereas the Leadership Code Act of 1998 specifically criminalises bribery. The proceeds of crime act criminalises money laundering and provides asset forfeiture. There is no freedom of information law to guarantee and regulate public access to official records; however, government and legislative procedures are usually transparent (Freedom House 2020e). The main institutions responsible for the government’s anti-corruption efforts are the Office of the Attorney General, police force, ombudsperson, auditor general, Public Service Commission and the Central Procurement (US Department of State 2019d).
Nauru

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Control of Corruption Score</th>
<th>Corruption Perceptions Index, score (rank)</th>
<th>The Economist Democracy Index</th>
<th>Press Freedom Index (rank)</th>
<th>Freedom House Score</th>
<th>Global Peace Index</th>
<th>UNCAC Status</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Latest available data (year in brackets)</td>
<td>-0.6 (2018)</td>
<td>33.7 (2018)</td>
<td>NA</td>
<td>NA</td>
<td>77/100, free (2020)</td>
<td>NA</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Background**

Nauru gained its independence in 1968, and it has a population of approximately 10,000 people. The country was briefly one of the wealthiest countries per capita in the world in the 1970s and 1980s due to the abundance of resources such as phosphates, but exhaustion of available mineral resources and poor investment of national funds led to the development challenges it is currently facing (Davies and Doherty 2018). The country became a tax haven and introduced the golden passport scheme in the 1990s, offering its passport to foreigners who paid between US$15,000 and US$50,000. However, the scheme was stopped in 2003 after it was linked to a number of Russian mafia and other criminal networks (Van Foosen 2007: 153-155). It was also blacklisted for its tax haven status and was removed in 2003 after making commitments to improve transparency and international cooperation in tax matters (OECD 2003).

While Nauruans generally enjoy political rights and civil liberties, the government has undertaken measures to side-step its political opponents, particularly the Nauru 19, a group who had been charged with a variety of crimes in connection with a 2015 anti-government protest (Freedom House 2020g).

**Main corruption challenges and institutional framework**

Corruption is a persistent issue in the country (Freedom House 2020g). In 2016, allegations of improper payments to senior government officials, including the then president Baron Waqa, by an Australian phosphate company emerged in 2016, and an investigation by Australian federal police remained ongoing (Freedom House 2020g). In 2018, a trial related to the scandal also took place in Singapore, where a local company was fined for bribing a Nauruan MP (Freedom House 2020g).

After the 2019 Paladin scandal, light was shed on the extent of corruption involved in the treatment of refugees and the companies hired for related services. Former president Sprent Dabwido, who had signed the offshore detention deal with Australia during his time as president, alleged that the money Nauru received from Australia for hosting the asylum processing centre had led to enormous levels of corruption (Davidson and Knaus 2019; Freedom House 2020g).

---

3 Investigations in Australia are ongoing as to whether offshore processing services procurement was “appropriately managed” in awarding a $423m contract to the “inexperienced and unknown company” Paladin to take over garrison services at Manus Island and another contract in Nauru (Davidson and Knaus 2019).
The criminal code (amended in 2011) criminalises acts of corruption. The Proceeds of Crime Act of 2004 provides the crime of money laundering and provisions for asset forfeiture. The Leadership Code Act was enacted in 2016 to hold those in power and authority accountable for their actions. However, there are no freedom of information laws or requirements for income or asset disclosure for appointed officials (US Department of State 2019e; Freedom House 2020g).
Samoa

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Control of Corruption</th>
<th>Corruption Perceptions Index, score (rank)</th>
<th>The Economist Democracy Index</th>
<th>Press Freedom Index (rank)</th>
<th>Freedom House Score</th>
<th>Global Peace Index</th>
<th>UNCAC Status</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Latest available data (year in brackets)</td>
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<td>75.0 (2018)</td>
<td>NA</td>
<td>21/180 (2020)</td>
<td>81/100, free (2020)</td>
<td>NA</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Background**

Samoa gained its independence from New Zealand in 1962, becoming the first independent Pacific Island country. According to Freedom House (2020h), there is a democratic political system in place, “though the same political party has been in government for decades, and only traditional heads of families are eligible to run as candidates”. Only citizens with matai status (chiefs or family heads) are permitted to run for office, and only 10% of approximately 17,000 matai are women (Heritage Foundation 2020d). The country has an independent judiciary, but it is perceived as being subject to interference from the executive branch (Heritage Foundation 2020d).

**Main corruption challenges and institutional framework**

According to the Heritage Foundation (2020d), official corruption is still a major cause of public concern. This includes the abuse of public funds, as witnessed by the accusations against the former minister of finance Faumuina Tiatia Liuga from both parliamentarians and the opposition over the alleged abuse of state resources and the administration of the Samoa Land Corporation (Corbett and Ng Shiu 2014: 749). In 2019, two senior members of the Public Service Commission were charged with stealing over $100,000 in public funds (Freedom House 2020h).

A police officer was arrested and charged with accepting a bribe from a drug dealer in possession of more than US$150,000 worth of cocaine and heroin connected with the neighbouring America Samoa (Loop Pacific 2019). In 2018, senior public officials have also been implicated in corruption scandals. For instance, the CEO of the Samoa Ministry of Works, Transport and Industry was suspended over allegations of corruption filed by a representative of a foreign company related to soliciting bribes, property and flights from the company in exchange for government contracts (Feagaimaali’i-Luamanu 2018).

According to a report by the UN Human Rights Council independent expert group on the issue of discrimination against women in law and in practice, women who ran for political offices during the 2016 parliamentary elections faced “deeply entrenched political machinery and processes that have served male candidates well over the decades as well as corruption” (United Nations 2017).

On the anti-corruption front, the main anti-corruption law is the Crimes Act 2013 which criminalises various corruption offences. However, anti-corruption laws are not always enforced uniformly, and Samoa does not have an anti-corruption commission (Heritage Foundation 2020d). The Proceeds of Crime Act of 2007 criminalises money laundering and provides measures for asset forfeiture.
Tonga

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>控制腐败</th>
<th>腐败感知指数</th>
<th>《剑桥经济人》民主指数</th>
<th>新闻自由指数</th>
<th>《有识之士》主权指数</th>
<th>全球和平指数</th>
<th>《UNCA》状态</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>最新可用数据（年份在括号内）</td>
<td>-0.1（2018）</td>
<td>55.3（2018）</td>
<td>NA</td>
<td>NA</td>
<td>50/180（2020）</td>
<td>79/100，自由（2020）</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**背景**

汤加于1970年成为独立和主权的英国联邦内的国家。

它在2010年举行了第一次民主选举，结束了165年的封建统治（BBC 2018a）。不过，国王仍保留着至关重要的权力，包括否决立法、解散议会和任命司法官员的权力。虽然公民权利通常得到保障，但继续面临的挑战包括对国家广播机构的政治压力（Freedom House 2020i）。

被选中的首相和他的内阁控制着政府政策的制定与实施，国王继续依赖于由自己任命的顾问团就使用其宪法权力提供意见（Freedom House 2020i）。

**主要腐败挑战和制度框架**

腐败和滥用职权在该国是主要问题（US Department of State 2019f；Freedom House 2020h）。例如，前首相Tu‘ivakano勋爵被逮捕并面临多项指控，包括据称作出虚假陈述以获取汤加护照以及洗钱（Matangi Tonga 2018）。他的审判正在进行中（Freedom House 2020i）。


The Criminal Offences Act of 1926 (revised in 1988) criminalises various acts of corruption, whereas the Money Laundering and Proceeds of Crime Act of 2000 criminalises money laundering offences and provides measures for asset forfeiture. The Anti-Corruption Commissioner Act 2007 established the anti-corruption commission; however, there have been long delays in operationalising the commission. In the meantime, the Office of the Ombudsman and the Office of the Auditor General are tasked with investigating official corruption (US Department of State 2019f). There is no freedom of information law, and in practice, public access to government information is difficult to obtain (Freedom House 2020h).
Anti-corruption programmes by donors

There are various anti-corruption programmes in the region aimed at enhancing transparency and accountability. The list of anti-corruption programmes by donors provided in this section is not exhaustive, hence some programmes could have been excluded.

Transparency and Accountability for People of Solomon Islands Project

The project is partnership between the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) and the Government of Solomon Islands which was launched in 2017 and is aimed at supporting anti-corruption strategies in the country (UNDP 2020a). Under this project, the UNDP provides policy advice, capacity development support and implementation services to advance the national anti-corruption agenda. It also supports the government to fulfil its commitment under UNCAC and the Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs), particularly SDG 16 on enhanced anti-corruption, transparency and accountability (UNDP 2020a).

The major achievements of the project in 2019 included the revision of the National Anticorruption Strategy and the Action Plan (2017-2019) and assistance with technical support for the establishment of the Solomon Islands Independent Commission Against Corruption as well as organising workshops for the newly appointed anti-corruption commissioners. In addition, it collaborated with ten civil society organisations and provided small funds to enhance public awareness and support anti-corruption programmes in selected rural communities in the Solomon Islands (UNDP 2020a).

UNDP’s Anti-Corruption for Development Effectiveness Project in Papua New Guinea

The UNDP project supports the implementation of the 2010-2030 National Anti Corruption Strategy in Papua New Guinea. Its objectives include supporting participatory, coordinated and timely implementation of the national strategy across key sectors, strengthening key anti-corruption institutions and legal frameworks, and empowering civil society, media and the public to advance anti-corruption reforms (UNDP no date).

The project lists its achievements as including UNCAC ratification and PNG’s participation in the UNCAC Review Mechanism, providing technical support on the framework for the national strategy and support on the implementation by the Anti-Corruption Task Force Secretariat. In addition, it reports that it strengthened investigative journalism and public awareness through its anti-corruption awards in 2011 and 2012, and increased the skills of anti-corruption journalists. Lastly, it takes credit for strengthening anti-corruption partnerships with Transparency International PNG, Business Alliance Against Corruption, Australian and National Broadcasting Corporation and the British High Commission (UNDP no date).

United Nations Pacific Regional Anti-Corruption project (UN-PRAC)

UN-PRAC is a joint project established in 2012 between UNDP and the United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime to support Pacific Island countries (PICs) with the implementation of UNCAC and to develop or strengthen their anti-corruption systems (UNODC/ UNDP 2012). It is funded by the Australian Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade (DFAT) and it is based in UNDP’s Effective Governance Unit in the UNDP Pacific Office in Fiji (DFAT 2019). Recently, New Zealand entered into a partnership with the project and will be providing financial support for two and a half years (UNDP 2020).

According to the 2019 Independent Project Evaluation report, the concrete achievements of the project included UNCAC ratification by Niue and Samoa, right to information systems were
established in Vanuatu and national anti-corruption strategies were adopted in the Solomon Islands and Kiribati (UNODC/ UNDP 2019: 38). It also noted the effectiveness of supporting youth activists in the region, and that efforts have been made to enhance women engagement in the project, but greater effort was required to ensure their targeted and mainstreamed engagement (UNODC/ UNDP 2019: 49-50).

The evaluation report recommended increased focus on right to information systems, revisions in project administration, transitioning the project into a regional programme that provides both national and regional project elements, increasing the donor base of the regional work, reconsidering the added value of small grants and focusing more on strategic relationships with regional stakeholders. In addition, it recommended promoting more bilateral and multi-lateral interactions between beneficiaries, and mainstreaming of gender equality in all activities as well as the development of specific, targeted interventions for women (UNODC/ UNDP 2019: 52-54).

Recently, the UN-PRAC project has been involved in anti-corruption vocational trainings in the Pacific region as well. Between May and December 2020, UN-PRAC and the Australia Pacific Training Coalition (ACPT) will be conducting an anti-corruption education and training in Fiji, Papua New Guinea, Samoa, Solomon Islands and Vanuatu. The two organisations agreed to jointly develop and deliver an anti-corruption module in conjunction with APTC’s Leadership and Management Programme, jointly engage in anti-corruption awareness programmes in the region and to develop anti-corruption materials including improving the Pacific Youth Anti-Corruption Advocate’s Toolkit (UNDP 2020).

Transparency International Indo-Pacific Partnership for Strong, Transparent, Responsive & Open Networks for Good Governance (TI IPP STRONGG)

TI IPP STRONGG is a project (from 2020 to 2023) by Transparency International aimed at empowering a strong and independent civil society voice and network in the Indo-Pacific region that can mobilise action in support of increased accountability of public and private institutions nationally and regionally. It builds on a previous programme, the Asia Pacific Regional Programme: Effective and Accountable Governance for Sustainable Growth that was implemented from 2016 to 2019 (Transparency International 2020b).

The 2018 independent mid-term evaluation of the preceding Asia Pacific Regional Programme highlighted the benefits of Transparency International’s multi-level engagement (at national, regional and international level) to anti-corruption work in the region, and confirmed the successful alignment of Transparency International and DFAT’s current approaches and strategies. It also noted progress in mainstreaming gender into the programme, though with some inconsistencies from national chapters (Karlberg Consulting 2018: 4-5).

Its recommendations include A review of Transparency International’s theory of change, results framework, and terminology for target groups and beneficiaries, strengthening the capacity of national chapters. Furthermore, it recommended the finalisation and implementation of a new approach to supporting work in the Pacific, focusing on supporting national and regional efforts. For more outreach, national chapters were recommended to use more partnerships and more effective communications and campaign strategies. It also recommended more work to strengthen the anti-corruption legislation initiative and strengthen enforcement of anti-corruption mechanisms in the region (Karlberg Consulting 2018: 6-7).
Indo-Pacific Transparency Initiative
The United States launched the Indo-Pacific Transparency Initiative in 2018 to support over 200 programmes (worth more than US$600 million) developed by US government agencies focused on anti-corruption and fiscal transparency, democracy assistance, youth and emerging leader development, media and internet freedom, and protecting fundamental freedoms and human rights (US Department of State 2019).

During the Indo-Pacific Business Forum and East Asia Summit in November 2019, the US government announced an additional US$68 million for new programmes, such as regional governance programmes for the Pacific Islands and South Asia and support for democratic elections in Burma. In addition, it announced the establishment of the new Indo-Pacific Transparency Fund, which is a multi-stakeholder partnership initiative aimed at supporting projects that promote the rule of law, civic space, and transparent and accountable governance in the Indo-Pacific region (US Department of State 2019).

Recently, the US Department of State Bureau of Democracy, Human Rights, and Labor announced a call for proposals from interested organisations to submit applications for projects that promote transparent and accountable governance in the Indo-Pacific region during the COVID-19 pandemic. According to the call for proposals, the budget for the proposal should be between US$1.5 million and US$3 million, and should operate for between 12 and 30 months (US Department of State 2020).

UNDP Strengthening Legislatures in Pacific Island Countries Project
This is a three-year project that focuses on strengthening six legislatures in six Pacific countries: Fiji, Samoa, Vanuatu, Solomon Islands, Republic of Marshall Islands and the Federated States of Micronesia. The project seeks to provide support to parliaments in these countries to become more effective and efficient through strengthening the work of their committees related to legislation and oversight, and building the capacities of legislators and the professionalism of staff (UNDP 2018).

Lowy Institute Pacific Aid Map
The Lowey Institute Pacific Aid Map has data on more than 20,000 projects in 14 countries supplied by 62 donors from 2011 onwards. Data for most donors have only been provided up to and including 2017. Data for 2018 and 2019 is incomplete and not representative of all aid flows to the region. According to this open database, the top five donors in the Pacific region in the sector of government and civil society are:

- Australia ($855.67M)
- New Zealand ($221.24M)
- Japan ($187.52M)
- China ($171.69M)
- United States ($157.80M)

It ought to be noted that while Australia is the biggest provider of aid and investment to several countries in the region, including PNG and Vanuatu, China is progressively playing a larger role, especially in infrastructure projects, such as roads and schools.4 At the end of 2018, PNG owed almost 24% of the country’s total external debt of approximately A$588 million (US$402 million) to China (Human Rights Watch 2020). The concern, however, is around the opacity of government borrowing from China. For example, in 2018, the Australian media reported that China planned on building a military base on the island of Espiritu Santo, triggering firm denials from the Vanuatu government. In 2019, Foreign Minister Ralph

4 This is part of China’s Belt and Road Initiative. See the analysis from Lowry Institute:

Regenvanu cautioned that Chinese investment was fuelling corruption in Vanuatu (Freedom House 2019d).

To sum up, many anti-corruption programmes have yielded some success on policy changes and institutional reforms in the region. Nonetheless, as discussed in the paper, corruption remains a huge challenge in most countries. According to Walton and Jackson (2019: 25), responding with one-size-fits-all measures may prove ineffective in the region, for instance without taking into account the context of common cultural systems such as the wantok system that manifest across and within subnational administrations. As such, social or cultural norms and practices driving political will need to better understood and factored into anti-corruption programmes and advocacy work.
## Annex: regional overview of governance indices

<table>
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</tr>
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<td>Papua New Guinea</td>
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<td>17.8</td>
<td>137</td>
<td>6.03</td>
<td>46</td>
<td>62 (partly free)</td>
<td>Ratified (2007)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fiji</td>
<td>0.4</td>
<td>67.3</td>
<td>NA</td>
<td>5.85</td>
<td>52</td>
<td>60 (partly free)</td>
<td>Ratified (2008)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Solomon Islands</td>
<td>0.0</td>
<td>57.7</td>
<td>77</td>
<td>NA</td>
<td>NA</td>
<td>79 (free)</td>
<td>Ratified (2012)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Vanuatu</td>
<td>-0.2</td>
<td>50.5</td>
<td>64</td>
<td>NA</td>
<td>NA</td>
<td>82 (free)</td>
<td>Ratified (2011)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kiribati</td>
<td>0.3</td>
<td>64.9</td>
<td>NA</td>
<td>NA</td>
<td>NA</td>
<td>93 (free)</td>
<td>Ratified (2013)</td>
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<td>Tuvalu</td>
<td>0.0</td>
<td>58.7</td>
<td>NA</td>
<td>NA</td>
<td>NA</td>
<td>93 (free)</td>
<td>Ratified (2015)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nauru</td>
<td>-0.6</td>
<td>33.7</td>
<td>NA</td>
<td>NA</td>
<td>NA</td>
<td>77 (free)</td>
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<td>Samoa</td>
<td>0.6</td>
<td>75.0</td>
<td>NA</td>
<td>NA</td>
<td>21</td>
<td>81 (free)</td>
<td>Ratified (2018)</td>
</tr>
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<td>-0.1</td>
<td>55.3</td>
<td>NA</td>
<td>NA</td>
<td>50</td>
<td>79 (free)</td>
<td>Ratified (2020)</td>
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</tbody>
</table>
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U4 Anti-Corruption Helpdesk

*Overview of corruption and anti-corruption in Pacific Island countries*


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The U4 anti-corruption helpdesk is a free research service exclusively for staff from U4 partner agencies. This service is a collaboration between U4 and Transparency International (TI) in Berlin, Germany. Researchers at TI run the helpdesk.

The U4 Anti-Corruption Resource Centre shares research and evidence to help international development actors get sustainable results. The centre is part of Chr. Michelsen Institute (CMI) in Bergen, Norway – a research institute on global development and human rights.

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