Illicit Political Financing and State Capture. Kupferschmidt, D., 2009. International IDEA. www.idea.int/resources/analysi...
This paper addresses the use of illicit political finance in a systematic manner to influence or capture agencies, local governments, territory or even the entirety of states. It suggests that illicit political finance is a key contributor to the underperformance and loss of credibility of democratic governments and proposes strategies for identifying, measuring and seeking to counteract flows of illicit political finance at the local and national level. It goes deeper to examine prevalent forms of illicit political financing and state capture, for example the use of money derived from narco-trafficking or the use of aid money to fund politics. Concluding sections look at the role of political financing in post-communist countries and examine whether or not lobbying can be considered legalised bribery within democratic societies.
Corrupting the rules of the game: From legitimate lobbying to capturing regulations and policies. Zinnbauer, D., 2009 In ‘Global Corruption Report: Corruption and the Private Sector’, Transparency International. http://issuu.com/transparencyinternational/docs/global_corruption_report_2009?e=2496456/2289759
The article focuses on the influence of corporate lobbying on the process of policy and decision making of governmental institutions. It discusses the influence of corporate lobbying on public affairs which include political corruption, conflict of interests between politics and business and integrity of information. Different measures to prevent undue corporate influence are also discussed including the provisions for good governance and full disclosure of policy purpose. These measures are subdivided into sections which differentiate between political actors affected by lobbying, namely governments, media and CSOs, lobbyists and corporations.
Lobbying, Corruption and other Banes. Campos, N., and Giovannoni, F., 2008. IZA Discussion Paper 3693. http://ftp.iza.org/dp3693.pdf
This study is based on survey data from 2002 for about 6,000 firms in 26 countries. The authors find that political institutions, both in the countries where companies originate and where they are operating, are instrumental in defining the choice between bribing and lobbying. The paper suggests that lobbying seems generally more effective than corruption as an instrument for political influence and that lobbying is more powerful than corruption as an explanatory factor for enterprise growth, even in poorer less developed countries which are often perceived as highly corrupt.
Bursting the Brussels Bubble: The battle to expose corporate lobbying at the heart of the EU. Alter-EU, 2010. www.alter-eu.org/sites/default...
This book provides a detailed critique of the role of lobbying in EU decision –making processes. It sheds light on how lobbying works in Brussels and reveals why lobbying transparency and reformed ethics are crucial in order to develop a more accountable and democratic form of decision making in the EU. Case studies examine different aspects of EU lobbying and explore how decision makers in Brussels interact with outside interests and pressure groups. The picture they portray provides a compelling argument for the need for radical reform, revealing a political culture in which, behind closed doors, the influence of business has become the norm.
Francesco Bosso, Maíra Martini, Iñaki Albisu Ardigó
Marie Chêne, Robin Hodess, Ph.D