Service delivery/client interface

At the point of service delivery, there are fewer opportunities for interaction between service providers and users than for other public services such as health and education. However, even if less visible, there are still opportunities for corruption at the point of service delivery.

There are relatively few agents responsible for delivering water to ordinary citizens, households and companies. In some countries, bribes may be extorted by service providers in exchange for access to a water connection. Administrative or petty corruption can also enable households, farmers, companies and other users to get access to water more quickly or cheaply. Public officials can be bribed to secure preferential treatment, such as securing access to water during the dry season, droughts or diverting water from one area to another.  

In some water-scarce countries, there are not always water connections in urban areas and various private providers (sometimes subsidised by the state) will deliver water via trucks to slum-dwellers. In such contexts, the interaction with service providers is as direct as for health and education services and often involves cash changing hands in exchange for water. There are well-documented cases of corruption scandals in New Delhi where basically a water mafia in league with local politicians and slum lords are at work.[1]

Kickbacks and bribes can also be offered to regulatory officials to turn a blind eye to water overuse or pollution discharge. In water treatment and sanitation services, corrupt water quality inspectors can provide false documentation on the quality of water that water treatment plants produce or the toxicity of waste water produced by industry. Companies and individuals may bribe officials to dispose of more waste than government regulated quotas, while corrupt inspectors can overlook the excessive extraction of water from fragile ecosystems and low water tables or the illegal dumping of raw industrial waste or sewage into natural ecosystems. Finally, inspectors involved in monitoring infrastructure quality may also be bribed to turn a blind eye to substandard materials and equipment.

Footnotes

Author

Iñaki Albisu Ardigó; Marie Chêne

Reviewer:

Matthew Jenkins

Contributing experts:

Umrbek Allakulov (Water Integrity Network)

Shaazka Beyerle (US Institute of Peace)

Simone Bloem (Center for Applied Policy)

Claire Grandadam (Water Integrity Network)

Jacques Hallak (Jules Verne University – Amiens)

Mihaylo Milovanovitch (Centre For Applied Policy)

Muriel Poisson (International Institute for Educational Planning (IIEP-UNESCO)

Juanita Riano (Inter-American Development Bank)

Marc Y. Tassé (Canadian Centre of Excellence for Anti-Corruption)

Vítězslav Titl (University of Siegen)

Davide Torsello (Central European University Business School)

Patty Zakaria (Royal Roads University)

Date

01/09/2017

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