This Anti-Corruption Helpdesk brief was produced in response to a query from one of Transparency International’s national chapters. The Anti-Corruption Helpdesk is operated by Transparency International and funded by the European Union.
Query
How do legislatures structure MPs’ involvement in budget allocation beyond their conventional scrutiny and approval role, what risks does comparative experience associate with different models of discretion, and what safeguards have been used to constrain them?
Summary
In a growing number of countries, members of parliament (MPs) do more than assess and approve the budget proposal developed by the executive branch, as they also directly control part of the funds. This Helpdesk Answer looks at three forms this takes, namely constituency development funds, earmarks in the United States and parliamentary budget amendments in Brazil. It examines the risks of each and the safeguards that have been used to manage them.
Experience across countries shows that these arrangements can lead to corruption, give sitting MPs an advantage at elections, and spread public investment across many small, poorly planned projects. Courts in several countries have stepped in, striking down or limiting the mechanisms themselves, but where one channel has been closed, discretion has often moved to another, less visible one. A combination of safeguards works best. Funds should be traceable from the MP to the final recipient, an independent body should check how they were used, MPs should be kept out of implementation, and spending should be linked to development plans. In the cases reviewed, MPs have only been convicted where a corrupt exchange could be proven. Misconduct that falls short of that threshold has usually gone unsanctioned, so other forms of accountability also matter.
Main Points
- Parliamentarian-directed expenditure takes three main forms: constituency development funds (CDFs), US congressional earmarks and Brazil’s parliamentary budget amendments. Each moves legislators beyond scrutiny and approval into deciding where public money goes.
- Brazil’s model is distinctive. Individual and caucus amendments must be executed by the government, each legislator’s individual share is guaranteed by the Constitution, and the sums involved are large. In 2026, legislators controlled 25% of discretionary spending in the federal budget, up from 2% in 2015 (The Economist 2026).
- Comparative evidence links these arrangements to corruption and misuse of funds, electoral advantage for incumbents and fragmented, needs-blind allocation, with documented cases in Brazil, India, Kenya, Mongolia, the Philippines and the United States.
- Restricting one channel tends to shift discretion into another, less visible one: the Philippines’ PDAF gave way to budget insertions, Colombia’s auxilios parlamentarios to cupos indicativos, US earmarks under the moratorium continued but became anonymous and less specific, and Brazil’s rapporteur amendments moved into ministry spending and later into committee amendments.
- Disclosure is necessary but not sufficient. Safeguards work when the money trail can be reconstructed end to end, verified by an independent body and linked to consequences, and when MPs are kept out of procurement and implementation.
- Criminal liability of MPs has turned on proof of a corrupt exchange, not on the extent of their discretion. Non-criminal accountability could address conduct that falls short of that threshold. Courts have also reviewed the allocation mechanisms themselves, notably in Colombia, the Philippines and Kenya, offering a route that does not depend on individual liability.
Authors
Vlora Rechica & Maria Constanza Castro
Reviewers
Jorum Duri (TI)
Guilherme France (TI Brazil)
Date
04/11/2026
Tags
Download PDF
